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INTRODUCTION
Charles Nunez  reputedly financed his drug habit by making explosives
and selling them to gang members  in western Massachusetts.'  In August  1995
he was approached  by Jose  Colon, one of his drug  suppliers.  Colon said he
wanted some pipe bombs "to blow up the Solids,"  a rival gang. Nunez readily
agreed to make the bombs. Together  they went  shopping  for ingredients,  ac-
companied  by Colon's friend  Frank Montanez.  They bought gunpowder  and
fuse material at a Connecticut  gun store, and picked up hardware at the local
Home Depot.2 En route, Nunez boasted of his previous  deals and showed off
his technical  knowledge  of explosives.  Once  back home,  Nunez  made  nine
short-fused  pipe  bombs  filled  with  gunpowder,  nails,  and  screws.  "[W]hen
you light this," Nunez warned, "you better run. It has nails and metal balls. If
you throw  it [it]  will kill  everybody."  Colon  left with  the bombs  stuffed in a
duffel bag, paying Nunez $75.
It was all a setup. Nunez was the victim of a "sting operation" conducted
by undercover police agents. Colon, the drug dealer, was a  police informant.
Montanez,  the passenger,  was an  undercover  state  trooper.  The  police  had
orchestrated the entire transaction.  Colon had worn  a wire when  visiting Nu-
nez; the car had contained  a  hidden video  camera;  the police  were listening
and  lying  in wait  as the  deal closed.  Nunez  was  arrested  and  charged  with
unlawfully possessing and selling the nine pipe bombs. He was sent to prison
for ten years-for a crime staged by the police.
This  Article  is the first systematic economic  analysis of undercover  po-
lice sting operations,  their role in the legal  system, and the courts'  use of the
"entrapment"  defense  to regulate  their  use.3  Sting  operations,  of which  the
* Professor  of Law,  Harvard  University. Thanks  to John  Hay, Phil Heymann,
Louis  Kaplow,  Steve  Shavell,  Andrew  Song,  Jennifer Zacks,  and workshop  partici-
pants at Harvard  for helpful comments. The research was supported by the Olin Cen-
ter for Law, Economics and Business  at Harvard.
1. This account is drawn from the United States v. Nunez,  146 F.3d 36, 37 (1st
Cir. 1998), along with the appellate briefs in the case (No. 97-1411).
2.  The conviction was sustained on appeal
3.  There  is an extensive  literature  on the entrapment  defense, but it focuses  on
the  doctrinal  foundations  and  formulations  of the defense,  frequently  attempting  to
sort out the ambiguities  in the courts'  definition of the defense. For a recent sample of
this literature, which contains citations to work in the area,  see Ronald  J. Allen et al.,
Clarifying Entrapment, 89  J.  CRIM.  L. &  CRIMINOLOGY,  407  (1999).  There  is  also
extensive  literature  on  the ethical  problems raised  by sting operations.  Probably the
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Nunez  case  is  a  fairly typical  example, are  a common  but controversial  law
enforcement  technique--controversial  because  the  police  participate  in,  or
even  orchestrate,  the  very  crime  for  which  the defendant  is  convicted.  The
principal purpose of this Article is to examine how sting operations  lower the
crime rate by identifying offenders and deterring crime.
The defining  feature  of a  sting  operation  is  that through  covert  means,
the authorities  create  or facilitate  the very offense of which the defendant  is
convicted.  Normally  this  is  done  by having  an  undercover  agent  hold  out
some  sort of bait,  or opportunity, to commit a crime,  and then punishing the
person who takes the bait. The obvious advantage  of this technique is that the
crime can  be caught  on tape,  thus eliminating many of the evidentiary  diffi-
culties of ordinary law enforcement.4  But it is this "manufactured"  quality of
the  offense  that makes  sting operations  so  troubling. (For  example,  Charles
Nunez  was convicted  of the  "staged"  sale of pipe bombs  to the undercover
agent.  He  was  not convicted  of the "real"  pipe bomb  sales  to gangs he  was
suspected  of.)  What business do law enforcement officials have encouraging,
or aiding, the commission of crimes?
The economic  inquiry  is  partly motivated  by questions of law enforce-
ment  policy:  what purposes  do sting  operations  serve? what  are their advan-
tages and drawbacks relative to other enforcement  methods?  when is a given
type  of sting  operation  desirable?  The  inquiry  is  also  motivated  by  corre-
sponding  questions  faced  by  courts:  should  the target  of a  successful  sting
operation  be punished  for his  offense?  under what  circumstances?  What,  in
other  words,  is  the  proper  structure  of the "entrapment  defense"  and related
judicial doctrines?
In some  respects,  the problem is  similar to the difficulties posed by pe-
nalizing  criminal  attempts.  A  sting victim who  (as  in  the Nunez  case)  is ar-
rested before  he does any harm  is in much the same  situation as an individual
who  is arrested  for unsuccessfully  attempting  to commit a  crime. As  the ar-
restee has,  by assumption,  caused  no harm  in either case,  the question  natu-
rally arises:  why should  he be punished?  This problem has prompted a lively
most  extensive  ethical  examination  is  contained  in  GARY  T.  MARX,  UNDERCOVER:
POLICE  SURVEILLANCE  IN  AMERICA  (1988).  See also Gerald  Dworkin,  The Serpent
Beguiled Me and I Did Eat: Entrapment and the Creation of Crime, 4 J. LAW & PHIL.
17 (1985).  One  student  note proposes  an economic  analysis of entrapment,  but con-
fines its focus  to  the tradeoff between deterring  and encouraging crime  as  a result of
police  creation  of criminal  opportunities.  See David  J.  Elbaz,  Note,  The  Troubling
Entrapment Defense: How About an Economic Approach?, 36 AM.  CRIM.  L. REV.  117
(1999).  Unlike the present article, the Note does not explicitly distinguish between the
informational  and  deterrent  functions  of sting  operations,  and  does  not  attempt  a
model of the optimal conditions for conviction.
4.  Nunez might well have been guilty of other bomb sales  in Massachusetts,  but
that  was  never  charged  or proven.  The  pipe bomb  sale of which  he was convicted
occurred only because a police agent solicited  it.
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debate  in the context of criminal attempts. 5 Sting operations  differ, however,
in  that it  is the government that  prompts the criminal  attempt  for which  the
sting victim is arrested and punished. Our  focus will be on the rationales  for
permitting, and limiting, this type of government activity.
This Article  focuses on two distinct functions of sting operations. One is
the  informational, or  investigatory,  function  of identifying  individuals  who
are  engaged  in  (or likely  to engage  in)  criminal  activity.  The  second  is  the
behavioral function  of deterring  individuals  from engaging  in (independent)
criminal  activity:  the threat of being  caught in  a sting may  scare individuals
away from genuine criminal opportunities that would otherwise seem appeal-
ing.  Though  complementary  in  some  respects,  these  functions  are  also  in
some tension  with each other. A sting operation  that does not  serve informa-
tional  purposes  may  be  good  for  deterrent  purposes,  and  vice  versa.  Their
problematic relation  is a main theme of the Article.
The  Article  is organized  as follows.  Part I is a general  overview of the
nature  of sting  operations,  their  purposes,  their  potential  advantages  over
other enforcement  methods,  and the dangers  they pose.  Parts II  and III ana-
lyze, respectively,  the informational  and deterrent effects of sting operations.
Part IV considers the relation between the informational and deterrent effects,
emphasizing the tensions between them.
Part V attempts  a model of a  socially desirable  sting operation, balanc-
ing its  informational  and/or deterrent  value  against  the danger of entrapping
otherwise-innocent  individuals.6 The model creates a framework  for identify-
ing desirable  sting operations, a framework that is necessarily very general in
character. To apply it to particular cases would require knowledge of parame-
ters  whose  value  is  an  empirical  question  the  Article  does  not  attempt to
quantify.  Part  VI  briefly discusses  some  general  applications  to  entrapment
doctrine. Part VII concludes.
I.  RATIONALES AND HAZARDS  OF STING OPERATIONS
A. Nature and Range of  Sting Operations
For our purposes,  a sting  operation  is  defined  as any  effort by the au-
thorities  to  encourage  wrongdoing,  with  the  intention  of punishing the  of-
fenses  that result. Normally  a sting  operation  is carried  out by agents acting
undercover, that is, concealing the fact that they work for the authorities. An
agent might be a  full-time police officer disguised as a private  citizen. Or an
agent might be a private citizen, often a crook hoping for leniency in sentenc-
5.  See, e.g.,  STEVEN  SHAVELL,  FOUNDATIONS  OF  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  OF LAW
pt.  5  (2004);  David  D.  Friedman,  Impossibility, Subjective Probability,  and Punish-
ment for Attempts, 20 J. LEGAL STUD.  179 (1991).
6. The  model  draws on  the well-developed  economic  analysis of law  enforce-
ment. See SHAVELL, supra note 5, at ch. 22-24, and the references  cited therein.
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ing, covertly working  as  a government  informant. The critical  feature  is that
the agent  is  authorized to  somehow promote  or  facilitate  (using those terms
broadly) the unlawful  activity of others, who are then penalized for that crime
(including the attempted  crime). We will use the terms  "target" or "sting  vic-
tim" to refer to the individuals who are thus caught and charged.
Sting operations  come  in two basic types.7  The first  type has the agent
pose as a participant  in unlawful  activity,  such as  a buyer or seller of illegal
goods or services.
8  In a familiar example,  an  agent might seek to purchase or
sell narcotics from a suspected drug dealer;  if the target makes the sale, he is
prosecuted. Or an  agent might pose  as a peddler of child pornography;  who-
ever buys his wares is arrested.  In another familiar example, an agent  seeks to
bribe a public official,  who is then arrested if he accepts the  bribe. Likewise,
an agent might pose as a buyer of trade secrets,  as an illegal gun merchant, as
a broker of pirated software,  as a foreign agent interested  in  buying national
security secrets, as a dealer in eagles and other protected species, or even (in a
recent example) as a trafficker in human body organs. There  are also cases in
which agents pose  as suppliers of stinger missiles designed  to blow commer-
cial aircraft out of the  sky.9
In other cases of this first type, the agent poses  not as a buyer or seller,
but  as  a  confederate  or coconspirator  of the target.  For  example,  an  under-
cover agent helps a gang plan  a bank robbery,  and the gang members are  ar-
rested when  they arrive  at the bank.  An  agent infiltrates  a  terrorist  cell and
helps plot an assassination,  for which the cell  members are  arrested  shortly
before  carrying  out  the  plan.  An  agent  agrees  to  help  fabricate  counterfeit
money or other valuable  items, and then his fellow counterfeiters are arrested.
An  agent  helps  drug  traffickers  import  cocaine  or  some  other  illegal  sub-
stance, and the traffickers  are arrested  when the contraband arrives. An agent
helps run a health care fraud operation,  in which insurers are billed for bogus
claims, and then nabs the organizers.
The second  basic type of sting operation  sets up  a decoy by having  an
agent pose as a prospective victim of unlawful  activity. For example,  a plain-
clothes  cop  walks  alone  late  at  night  in  a secluded  area,  inviting  attack by,
and then arresting, would-be muggers or rapists.' 0 Or a cop poses as a vagrant
7.  Most of the examples to follow are drawn  from newspaper  articles and judi-
cial case reports.
8. Among the best known recent cases are Abscam, in  which members of Con-
gress took bribes in  exchange for influencing immigration  authorities, and Operation
Greylord, in which Chicago judges took bribes in exchange for fixing cases.
9.  Other  examples  include  sting  operations  in  which  agents  buy  counterfeit
money  or luxury goods  such  as  Rolex watches;  stolen  credit  cards;  stolen  identities
obtained  from  social  security  cards;  worthless  securities  marketed  by  fly-by-night
brokers;  stolen or forged art.  Or they offer their services  as professional  hit men, ar-
sonists, burglars,  and so  forth.
10.  For  a  police  manual  on  this  technique,  see  CHARLES  BEENE,  DECOY  OPS:
FIGHTING  STREET CRIME  UNDERCOVER (1992).
[Vol. 70
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sleeping  on  the street, with  a wad of $20 bills protruding  from his  pockets;
whoever tries to grab the money is arrested. Or a fancy car is  left apparently
unattended on the street, with the doors unlocked and the keys in the ignition;
the police pounce if someone tries to drive off with the car. Or an agent poses
as a naive investor, "easy  prey"  for a  scam artist who goes to jail after trying
to bilk the agent. Or to take a common recent example involving the internet:
pretending to be  an adolescent,  a cop  strikes up  an on-line  friendship  with a
pedophile  and  agrees  to  meet  him somewhere  for  sex;  the police arrest  the
target when  he shows up. Another tactic  is  to convince the target to deal in a
larger  quantity  of narcotics  than  originally contemplated  by the  target,  trig-
gering a sentencing enhancement.
The examples I have given all involve enforcement of the criminal laws.
It is worth emphasizing, however, that the legal system makes use of stings in
many  civil  cases  as  well,  to enforce  administrative  licensing  and regulatory
requirements.  For example,  an  underage  agent  is  filmed  buying  alcohol  or
cigarettes at a store whose  license to sell  such goods is then suspended.  Or a
black undercover agent applies for an apartment  (or job, or bank loan) and is
told nothing  is available; minutes later a less qualified white agent applies and
is told  the  opposite;  the target  is then  charged with  violating antidiscrimina-
tion  laws.  An  industrial  concern  is  fined  after  arranging  to  have  its  wastes
illegally  dumped  by trash  haulers  who  turn  out  to  be  undercover  environ-
mental police. A mail-order  business  is ordered shut down after bilking con-
sumer protection  investigators posing as customers."1
Law enforcement  aside, stings are also used by private or public organi-
zations and associations  to protect themselves  from corruption  or theft.' 2 For
example, a firm creates  some enticement for employees to violate a company
policy-such  as  the  use  of drugs,  alcohol,  or company  computers  to  view
pornography-and  fires  those  who  fall  into  the  trap.  A  company  leaves
money  or  valuable  items  apparently  unattended  and  discharges  employees
who  take  the  bait.  Creators  of copyrighted  business  guides  deliberately  put
false  information  in their  material,  and  then take  legal  action  against those
who take the bait by copying the false information.  An employee is suspected
of theft, and the firm has another employee  go along with the scheme in order
to catch the suspect  red-handed.  Companies  create opportunities  for disgrun-
tled employees  to sell their secrets to rival  firms.  A jealous husband  deliber-
ately gives  his wife an opportunity to commit adultery and files  for divorce if
she succumbs. A mob boss or military dictator, concerned  about disloyalty in
11.  Other  examples:  agents  place  a  stuffed  deer  in  the  woods  during  the  off-
season, and hunters who  shoot at  it lose their hunting licenses;  black agents take a job
in order  to determine  whether black employees  are being  harassed on  the job; agents
pretend  to be purchasers of a business to  determine whether taxes have been  properly
paid;  or  agents  use  stings  to  enforce  civil  forfeiture  laws  against  laundered  money,
drug proceeds, illegal  aliens, and  so on.
12.  See generally Arthur  S. Hulnick, Dirty Tricks for Profit: Covert Action in
Private  Industry, 14 INT'L J. INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE  529 (2001).
20051
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the  ranks,  covertly incites  and  then  ruthlessly  suppresses  plots  to overthrow
him.' 3  Interestingly,  even  police  departments  use  sting  operations  against
their  own  undercover  agents  to  catch  rogue  agents.14  History  is  also  full  of
examples of sting operations.'
5
What unites all of these examples,  and defines them as sting operations,
is that  the  authorities  somehow  encourage  the  infraction then penalized. We
will use "encourage"  very broadly to encompass  any action designed to create
apparent opportunities  for crime,  or  to make  its  commission  easier or more
attractive.  We also use the  term "authorities"  very  broadly to mean whoever
has the power to impose the penalty in question. In the case of criminal penal-
ties,  the  authorities  are  the legal  system;  in  the  case  of nonlegal  sanctions
(e.g.,  terminating  a relationship),  the  authorities  may be a  private individual
or organization.  For clarity of exposition, most of our attention will be on the
use of stings by  the police to enforce  the criminal  laws, but it will be evident
that the analysis carries over to their use in civil law enforcement  and  in or-
ganizational management.
B. Law Enforcement Rationales
1. Informational  and Behavioral Functions
Why would  the government  want to encourage  infractions  that it  is re-
sponsible for preventing?' 6 Our analysis will emphasize two law enforcement
13.  A chilling  recent example  is reported  about the  Saddam Hussein  regime  in
Iraq. Officers  from unit A  would awaken  the officers  of unit B  in the  middle of the
night,  point  guns  at  their heads,  and  say,  "It's  a coup,  brother.  Are  you  with  us?"
Anyone who  said "yes" immediately got a bullet in the brain. See Bill  Keller, Spring-
time for Saddam, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2002, at A15.
14.  Other  examples:  private  sting  operations  to  enforce  trademarks;  to  catch
participants  in "gray markets"  for electronic  goods and the like;  to exclude  unsavory
characters  from private  clubs;  to  sell  illegal  cellular phone  services or long-distance
phone cards;  or stings by animal protection  societies  to catch the illegal treatment  of
animals.
15.  A  random  sample:  The  first  modem  police  forces  employed  professional
criminals  as  double agents  to  provoke  crimes  that would then  be punished.  Church
inquisitors  covertly  urged  parishioners  to  commit  heresy,  and  excommunicated  (or
worse) those who fell  for the ruse. Tsars and other autocrats routinely tested the loy-
alty of their underlings  by  employing agents provocateurs. (Z.B.  Zubatov,  a Tsarist
police chief, told dissidents:  "We  shall provoke  you to acts of terror and then crush
you,"  quoted in MARX, supra note 3, at 60.)  Even the gods have used sting operations;
the biblical  lord's purpose  in  ordering Abraham  to slay  his beloved  Isaac  was appar-
ently to tempt him to commit the crime of disobedience. The suffering of Job was also
a sting of sorts, testing  his loyalty.
16.  European  observers  are  often  surprised  at  the powers  given  police  in this
country  to involve themselves  in crime  in order to enforce the  law. See Gary T.  Marx,
[Vol. 70
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functions of sting operations-two  avenues by which encouraging infractions
may serve preventive purposes.17
a. Informational Functions
One purpose of sting operations is investigatory-to identify those  who
are engaged in, or likely to engage in, criminal activity. A target's response to
the  temptations  held  out  by  the  government  may  signal  his  propensity  to
commit the offense  in question;  punishing  him  is then justified, presumably,
on incapacitation grounds. If an undercover agent seeks to buy narcotics from
the target, and the target quickly produces  a large quantity packaged for sale,
this may  be taken as  an indication that he  is in  the business of dealing drugs
and (perhaps)  should be incarcerated.  If an agent posing as a job applicant is
turned down because  she is a woman,  this  may indicate  that the employer  is
also discriminating  against "real"  applicants on the basis of sex.
Testing of this  sort is  often the explicit purpose  of sting operations.  In
some cases,  the police suspect a given individual of unlawful  activity but lack
sufficient evidence  to  prove  it.  A  sting  is  then  set  up so that  the target  can
commit the offense in conditions  where evidence  is easy to get. In the case of
D.C.  mayor  Marion  Barry,  for  example,  the  police  had  heard  rumors  that
Barry was using crack cocaine.  So Barry's girlfriend, now working as an FBI
informer, lured him into smoking crack in a hotel room, where a hidden  cam-
era  recorded  everything.  Similarly,  in the Nunez pipe-bomb  case  mentioned
earlier, the word on the street was that Nunez was selling pipe bombs, and the
purpose of the sting was to catch him in the act.
In other cases,  the sting's objective  is to  identify unknown offenders or
would-be  offenders.  An unidentified  male attacks  a  series  of female joggers
in a park. To catch him, an undercover female  cop jogs through the park with
a  stakeout  team  watching.  A man  tries  to  grab  her  and is  charged  with  the
assault. A rash of thefts  occurs in  an office building;  a cash box is then delib-
erately left in an unlocked  office in order to catch the  thief red-handed.  Uni-
dentified judges  on  a court  are  rumored  to  be  fixing  cases  in exchange  for
bribes;  agents  pretending  to  be  lawyers  offer  bribes  to  randomly  chosen
judges, who  are then  nabbed if they accept.  A military agency  is concerned
that some  of its  employees may  be  security  risks;  it creates  some temptation
for them to leak information and takes legal  action against the ones who suc-
cumb.
Who Really Gets Stung? Some Issues Raised by the New Police Undercover Work, 28
CRIME & DELINQUENCY  165,  169 (1982).
17.  This  distinction  is not  novel. See, e.g.,  People v.  Holloway, 55  Cal. Rptr. 2d
547,  559 (Cal.  Ct. App.  1996),  overruled by People v.  Fuhrman, 67  Cal.  Rptr. 2d  1
(Cal.  1997);  Louis  Michael  Seidman,  The  Supreme  Court, Entrapment, and Our
Criminal Justice Dilemma,  1981  SuP.  CT.  REV.  111,  140-42.  But  their  economic
structure, and the tension between them, have not to my knowledge been examined.
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In each of these examples, the aim of the sting is to get the target to re-
veal  information  about  himself. Notice  that  the  sting  may or may  not yield
enough information to convict the target of offenses other than the one manu-
factured by the police. In  the jogger example, the arrest may turn up enough
evidence,  a  confession or eyewitness  testimony,  to convict  the defendant  of
other attacks;  or perhaps there is  insufficient evidence to convict him of any-
thing except  the assault on the  agent. In either event, the legal system  treats
the sting as having identified someone who should be taken off the streets.1
8
b. Deterrent Functions
The  second  function of stings  is the behavioral  one of deterring  unlaw-
ful  activity.  Would-be  culprits  are  less  likely  to  break  the  law  when  they
know that an apparently  genuine  criminal  opportunity  may be  a police  trap.
Potential confederates  become less trustworthy. If a dealer of illegal weapons
knows  that a  certain  number of buyers  are  really plainclothes  cops  (or  real
buyers who have been "flipped"  by the police), he will  cut back on his  sales
and perhaps leave the business  altogether. Potential  victims also become less
inviting.  If a would-be  mugger or rapist  fears that a prospective  victim  is in
fact a police decoy, he may think twice before acting on his violent urges.
Achieving  these  deterrent  effects  is  the  obvious  goal  of many  sting
operations.  This is especially clear in cases where the government  announces
in advance that it will be using sting operations to catch offenders. For exam-
ple, employees  in sensitive positions  are often told that their  integrity will be
periodically  tested by undercover  agents. Government  licensing boards warn
liquor merchants  that teenage agents  will be  attempting to buy alcohol  from
them, and that any seller caught  in the sting will lose his license.  Police issue
press releases announcing  that agents are being sent into the streets to pose as
drug dealers.
c.  The Difference Between Informational and Deterrent Functions
The difference  between informational  or investigatory  functions on  one
hand and deterrent  functions  on the other requires  a  good deal of emphasis.
Sometimes  it is quite clear that  the government  is trying to catch and punish
wrongdoers.  This  is  most evident  in  cases  where the  government  keeps  the
existence of the sting operation  a well-guarded  secret.  The  idea is to get the
wrongdoer to trust the undercover agent  so that  he  will commit his  crime in
"plain  view"  (that  is,  in  front  of  surveillance  cameras).  If catching  such
18. Notice  also  that in  using stings  to gather incriminating  information,  the po-
lice may not necessarily be interested  in prosecuting the target. Their objective, rather,
may  be  to  pressure  the  target  into providing  information  about  his  confederates-
especially higher-ups  in a criminal organization-by  threatening him with jail time if
he does not cooperate.
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criminals is the objective, the more the target believes his apparent confeder-
ates or victims are genuine, the better.
In  deterrent  stings,  the  opposite  holds.  The government  wants to  sow
distrust among crooks  so that (ideally) every crook  is afraid that his confeder-
ates  or  victims  are  agents.  This  is  why  the  government  sometimes  widely
publicizes  the  existence of sting  operations.  Such announcements  would  be
inexplicable  if the  government's  objective  were  solely to  identify wrongdo-
ers. If the police simply wanted to catch actual or potential drug purchasers,  it
would hardly do to say publicly that it was sending out agents to transact with
them,  for  this  would  scare  many  purchasers  away.  But  scaring them  away
may be precisely  the point. If so, advertising the existence of undercover op-
erations makes eminent sense.19 Hence one urban mayor's warning that some
drug dealers on the street were actually police officers standing ready to arrest
their customers: "'We want everybody to know that the next drug buy may be
from a police officer.'
2 0
This is not to suggest that informational and behavioral functions of stings
are  always  mutually exclusive.  A  sting may  perform both  at  once. A  heavily
publicized  buy-and-bust  program,  for example,  may both  scare  some dealers
off the  street and also  enable  the police  to  identify  and  convict  the ones who
remain.  But analytically  the two functions  are separate.  Indeed,  as  our discus-
sion of warnings  suggests, there  is some  tension between  the two. Advancing
one may mean compromising the other-a problem we will return to.
2.  Potential Advantages over Other Enforcement Methods
Stings are not the only way of pursuing the informational and behavioral
objectives. There  are also other methods which do not involve the potentially
troubling  deceptions  associated  with  sting operations.  Why  resort  to stings?
What advantages  might they have over alternative  methods  which would not
require  the  government  to encourage  or participate  in crime?  Let us  briefly
compare the alternatives.
a. Ex Post Enforcement
One general  alternative  is to rely purely on ex post enforcement-that is,
waiting for a  crime to happen and then  arresting and punishing the perpetra-
tors. A well-known  difficulty  with  this  option is  that for many  offenses,  the
only witnesses  are willing participants. Obvious examples  include the trade in
19.  Of course,  such  announcements  may  serve other purposes  as well,  such  as
persuading the public that the police are doing their job.
20. Gary  T. Marx,  Under-the-Covers Undercover Investigations: Some Reflec-
tions on  the State's Use of Sex  and Deception in Law  Enforcement, GRIM.  JUST.
ETHics (Winter/Spring  1992),  at  13,  13  (quoting  Washington  Mayor  Marion  Barry,
News  Conference,  1988).  The mayor quoted  is  none other than  Marion  Barry,  who
made the remark a few years before his own arrest for smoking crack cocaine.
20051
9
Hay: Hay: Sting Operations, Undercover Agents, and Entrapment
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
drugs and  other  illegal  items,  organized  crime,  corruption,  espionage.  With
the  witnesses  remaining  silent  (even  if they  are  found,  they  can  take  the
Fifth),  the police  often  have  insufficient  evidence  to  convict.  What  convic-
tions  they  do get  may  be  based  on  very  imperfect  evidence,  with  a  corre-
sponding risk of error.
A  separate  difficulty  with  ex post enforcement  is  that  it  may  simply
come  too  late.  Terrorists,  for  example,  may  be  undeterred  by the  threat  of
criminal  penalties,  even  if  there  are  no  evidentiary  obstacles  to  conviction.
They may be suicide bombers;  even if they are not,  they may welcome pun-
ishment as a  form of martyrdom.  The only way to prevent them from inflict-
ing catastrophic  losses  is to  catch them before  they strike.  So too with  other
undeterrables,  such  as  predatory  sex  offenders.  Compulsive  child  molesters
often  continue  for  years  or even  decades before  their  victims  finally  come
forward.  By the time  they are  caught through  ex post methods, they have  al-
ready done unacceptable  harm.
b.  Pure Surveillance
A second general  enforcement strategy is to undertake pure surveillance
of unlawful  activity.  By pure surveillance,  I mean government  efforts to ob-
serve  crime  without actually  participating  in or encouraging  it. (The surveil-
lance may be overt, meaning the government  agents are recognizable  as such,
or covert, meaning they are not.)  Familiar examples include wiretaps, security
cameras  in banks and other places, uniformed  or plainclothes  cops patrolling
to watch  for crime,  spies planted to  eavesdrop  on (but not  assist) suspected
criminals,  or  random  inspections  of workplaces  and  the  like.  These  differ
from sting  operations  in  that government  agents  do not  take  part  in  crime,
either as participants or as  supposed victims. They simply observe, or record,
the criminals'  activity and then make  an arrest-perhaps before the crime has
been  completed,  as when  the police  overhear  a bank  robbery  plot and  then
wait for the robbers at the bank, arresting them before they can carry out their
plan.
The  difference  between  stings and pure  surveillance-between  encour-
aging crime  and merely  observing it-is partly a matter of degree. In a sense,
any covert  police surveillance  may be  said to  "encourage"  crime  because  it
hides  the presence  of the police.  Concealment  makes the risk of arrest  seem
lower, which,  all  else  being equal,  makes  crime  more  attractive.  A  driver  is
more  likely to  speed  in the presence  of an unmarked  police  car  than in  the
presence  of a blue  squad  car. But there remains  an important  difference  be-
tween  sting  operations  and  pure  surveillance:  in  a  sting,  police agents  take
some  measure  to  encourage  crime  beyond  simply concealing  their  presence
from the target. They also put out some  sort of bait.
The potential advantage  of using bait-rather than just relying on  pure
surveillance-is  that  it  is  generally  easier  to  catch  offenders  with  a  lower
expenditure  of resources  and  with  less  infringement  of privacy.  Consider  a
graft  case.  The  police  hear  a  rumor that certain  officials  are  taking  bribes.
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One  way  to  investigate  the  rumor  would  be  to  watch  the  officials  very
closely-eavesdrop  on their  meetings,  tap their  phones, read  their mail,  ex-
amine their bank records, and  so on.21 A much simpler approach  would be to
have an  undercover agent offer them each a bribe. The latter course intrudes
less on the innocent and is less labor intensive than the former; it may also be
more effective in rooting out corruption.
This point holds quite generally. The problem is no different from catch-
ing mice: if mice are lurking  behind the  walls of a house,  it is easier to catch
them by putting  out baited traps  than by dismantling  the walls  to search  for
them. Just  so  with  offenders whose  actions  or identities  are  not  readily  ob-
servable  to the  authorities.  Luring them  into committing  their crimes  in the
open may be far preferable,  in terms of both protecting privacy  and conserv-
ing law enforcement  resources, to the types of passive  surveillance  necessary
to yield a comparable chance of accurate conviction.
C. The Problem of  Entrapment
So sting operations  have substantial potential  advantages  over their ma-
jor alternatives.  Yet  they pose  problems  of their  own.  The  great  danger  of
sting operations  is that they  may  lure generally  law-abiding  individuals  into
committing  offenses they otherwise  would not commit. Consider  the case of
an  individual  who,  targeted  in  a  sting  operation,  is  somehow  talked  into
committing a crime.  Had the agents left him alone, he never would have done
anything unlawful,  then or at any other time. Assume,  for purposes of analy-
sis, that this is known  with certainty. Does it  make sense to punish  him for a
crime the police have persuaded him to commit?
One polar position would have it that such an individual  should never be
convicted  because  the  police  have  no  business  stirring  up  crime.  There  is
already more than enough crime in our society without the police adding to it,
and it invites trouble for the police to involve themselves in instigating crime.
For example, sting  operations often  require the police to get  mixed  up with,
indeed to  hire, professional  crooks to  set traps  for unwary  criminals;  that is
the  only  way  to  get  the  trust  of the targets.  This  blending  of functions,  in
which the police befriend and employ people who belong behind bars,  invites
corruption  and blackmail, depletes the symbolic value of the law, and sullies
the courts who  are asked  to  put their stamp of approval  on it.23  Courts  have
21.  I leave aside the question whether these measures would be constitutional.
22.  Corrupt  cops sometimes  commit  crimes  and  then  claim  it was just  a  sting
operation.  A related problem is that a cop may induce an individual to commit a crime
caught on tape and extort money to keep it secret.
23. An early statement of this position:
Some courts have gone a great way in giving encouragement to detectives,
in some very questionable  methods adopted  by them to  discover the guilt
of criminals; but they have not yet gone so far, and I trust never will, as to
lend aid or encouragement to officers who may, under a mistaken sense of
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spoken of the judiciary's need to "protect itself and the government  from such
prostitution  of the criminal  law.''24  The  problem  with  this polar  position  is
that it ignores the difficulties raised by the alternative law enforcement meth-
ods canvassed  above.
The  opposite  polar  position  would  be  that  the  sting  victim  should be
punished  like  any other  offender.  What  matters,  it  might  be  said,  is  that  he
broke the law, not who his accomplices  were. He would not be acquitted  if it
had been an ordinary civilian  who talked him into committing his crime. Why
should  we  care  that  it  was  a  cop  (or  someone  working  for the  cops)  who
talked  him into  it?  This  was  the position  taken  in some  early judicial  deci-
sions. In  one  early New York case,  the court thought  it immaterial  that the
police had  lured the defendant into the bribery scheme  he was  convicted of.
"We  are asked  to protect the defendant,  not  because he  is  innocent,  but be-
cause a zealous  public  officer ...  held  out a bait.  The courts do not look  to
see who held out the bait, but to see who took it." 25
This second  polar position raises  evident  difficulties.  To begin  with, it
serves no real  law  enforcement  goals for the authorities to set traps for indi-
viduals who would  comply with the  law if let alone by the authorities.  Pun-
ishing these  individuals,  or threatening  them  with  punishment,  will  not im-
prove their behavior;  by assumption, they are otherwise  law-abiding. Punish-
ing them  is counterproductive,  because resources  are dissipated  on harmless
individuals  instead of being concentrated  on those who pose a genuine  crimi-
nal threat.
26
Also,  setting traps for the law-abiding creates  a great potential for abuse
of governmental  power. Police officials could lure their enemies into commit-
duty, encourage  and assist parties  to commit  crime, in order that they may
arrest and have  them punished  for so doing....  Desire to  commit crime
and  opportunities  for  the  commission  thereof  would  seem  sufficiently
general  and numerous, and no  special efforts would seem necessary  in  the
way of encouragement  or assistance in that direction.
Saunders v. People, 38 Mich. 218, 222 (1878)  (Marston,  J.,  concurring).
24. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 457 (1932)  (Roberts,  J.,  concurring).
25.  People  v.  Mills,  178  N.Y.  274,  289  (1904).  See  also Bd.  of Comm'rs  v.
Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1864):
[T]he allegation of the defendant would be but the repetition of the plea as
ancient  as  the  world,  and  first  interposed  in  Paradise:  "The  serpent be-
guiled  me and  I did eat."  That defence  was overruled  by the  great Law-
giver,  and  whatever estimate  we  may  form,  or whatever judgment  pass
upon  the  character  or  conduct  of the  tempter,  this  plea  has  never since
availed  to  shield  crime or  give  indemnity  to the culprit,  and  it is safe  to
say  that under  any  code  of civilized,  not  to say  christian  [sic]  ethics,  it
never will.
This position, which allowed no defense of entrapment,  did not survive the nineteenth
century.
26. Judge  Posner  made  this point in  United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d  1004,
1010 (7th Cir. 1983)  (concurring opinion).
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ting crimes, and then use these as a pretext for jailing them. This  is a common
technique  by  which  authoritarian  governments  get  rid  of dissident  groups.
("Just give us a person-and we'll create the case.") 27 In this country as well,
government agencies have on occasion resorted  to this strategy in order to jail
or blackmail political opponents.
28
Finally,  aside  from wasted  enforcement  resources  and  the  dangers  of
abuse,  it is  socially  costly to have  the  police stirring  up  and then punishing
crimes.  The stirred-up  crime  itself may cause  harm:  usually the police try to
make  an  arrest  before  any real  harm  is  done, but there is  no  guarantee they
will succeed.  For example,  if a police officer poses as  a drug dealer, he may
inspire  a customer  to  mug  a  bystander  for drug  money.29  The  punishment,
too,  is costly; if the sting victim would not have committed the crime without
police inducement, locking him up is needlessly destructive.
The defense of "entrapment"  represents courts'  response-a sort of mid-
dle course-between  the polar  positions just described. 3 0  This  doctrine,  or
more  properly  cluster  of doctrines,  is  a  complex  amalgam  of judge-made
common  law,  statutes, and constitutional  law. If a  defendant is proven  guilty
of all of the elements of an  offense, he may nonetheless raise  the defense  of
entrapment  if, under specified circumstances,  he  was lured  by the  police  (or
an  agent  working  at police  behest)  into committing his  crime.  Because  it  is
generally  not rooted  in  federal  constitutional  law,  each  state (as  well  as  the
federal judiciary for federal prosecutions) has its own entrapment rules.3'
Broadly speaking, the defense is designed to prevent the police from lur-
ing  individuals  into  committing  crimes  they  would  probably  not  otherwise
27. ALEKSANDR  I.  SOLZHENITSYN,  THE  GULAG ARCHIPELAGO  1918-1956,  at  146
(Thomas P. Whitney trans.,  1973).
28.  See MARX,  supra note 3,  at 63-65,  for examples and discussion  of this prob-
lem.  To  mitigate  this  type of danger,  some  have  proposed  that sting  operations  be
limited  to  cases  in  which  there  is  a reasonable  suspicion  or  probable  cause that the
target  is  already  engaged  in  criminal  behavior.  See, e.g.,  Maura  F.J.  Whelan,  Com-
ment, Lead Us Not into (Unwarranted) Temptation: A Proposal to Replace the En-
trapment Defense with a Reasonable-suspicion  Requirement, 133 U. PA.  L. REv.  1193
(1985).  The proposal  has generally  been  rejected,  though  it was adopted  by the Ne-
vada  Supreme  Court  in  Shrader  v.  State,  706  P.2d  834  (Nev.  1985),  overruled by
Foster v. State,  13 P.3d 61  (Nev. 2000).
29. In one study, there was evidence that in creating a fencing operation  for sto-
len  goods,  a  police  sting  encouraged  more  thefts.  See  Robert  H.  Langworthy,  Do
Stings Control Crime? An Evaluation of a Police Fencing Operation,  6  JUST. Q. 27
(1989).
30.  On  the  historical  development  of the  doctrine,  see  Michael  A.  DeFeo,  En-
trapment as a Defense to Criminal  Responsibility: Its History, Theory and Applica-
tion,  1 U.S.F.  L. REv. 243 (1967).
31.  Sometimes  a defendant  may  establish that the government's conduct  was so
outrageous  that it violated the federal  due process  clause,  but this is  exceedingly un-
usual.  Virtually  all  entrapment  cases  are  based  on  common  law  or (in  the  case  of
some states) on statutes.
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commit.  In  spite of its name,  the entrapment  doctrine does not bar  all police
traps: the government is sometimes permitted to lure individuals into commit-
ting crimes  and then punish  them for those  crimes.  The  crux  of the entrap-
ment  doctrine is that individuals  may only be convicted for falling  into gov-
ernment traps if they were,  in  some  sense, ready  or likely to commit  crimes
without government  encouragement.  Interestingly,  the doctrine appears to be
limited  to  the criminal  context;  it does  not  seem  to be  applied  to  civil  law
enforcement  or enforcement  of private  organizational  rules  such as employ-
ment regulations.
32
Two basic  legal formulations  of, or approaches  to, the entrapment  doc-
trine are in currency. One approach  focuses on the proclivities of the individ-
ual sting victim: courts ask whether this particular  defendant  was likely to, or
inclined to, commit the offense if the police had not lured him into doing  so.
Typically, this formula turns on the defendant's  state of mind before the sting.
If he was  not "predisposed"  (or  "ready and  willing")  to commit  the  crime
before being  lured  into doing  so, he  cannot be convicted  of the resulting of-
fense.33 This  formulation  is  conventionally  called the  "subjective"  approach
to entrapment. Under this approach,  the court examines  the  particular defen-
dant's reputation, criminal record, and so forth.
The  second  approach  focuses  not  on the propensities  of the individual
defendant, but rather on the bait put out for him by the police. It asks whether
the bait is likely,  in general, to lure  otherwise-innocent  people into commit-
ting  crimes.  An  influential  statement  of this  approach  is  contained  in  the
Model  Penal  Code:  entrapment occurs  when  a  police agent  "encourages  an-
other person to [commit an offense] by...  employing methods of persuasion
or inducement that create  a substantial  risk that such an offense will be com-
mitted by persons other than those who  are ready to  commit it." 34  This  is
commonly  referred to as the "objective"  test for entrapment because  it looks
at  a hypothetical  average person's response  to  the bait  used by the police.
35
32.  See United  States v.  Hollingsworth,  27 F.3d  1196,  1203  (7th Cir.  1994)  (en
banc); Grasso  v. Forrest Edward  Employment  Servs., No.  01 CIV. 3263(AKH),  2002
WL  989528,  at  *9  (S.D.N.Y.  May  15,  2002)  ("[E]ntrapment  is  a  defense  only  to
criminal  charges  and has  no applicability  as an  affirmative  civil  claim."); Vassar  v.
Baxter  Healthcare  Corp.,  No.  4:93CV97BO,  1995  WL  1945546,  at  *5  (N.D. Miss.
June  29,  1995)  (suit alleging  entrapment  of employee  by employer  does not  state a
claim).
33.  See, for example, Jacobson v.  United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992),  in which a
government  front organization,  acting  a child pornography  operation, embarked on a
26-month  campaign  (eventually successful) to get the defendant to buy child pornog-
raphy.  Id. at  543-46.  The campaign  included  literature  suggesting that ownership  of
such  material  was protected by the  First Amendment. Id. at  543-44.  The Court held
that  the  defendant  should  have been  acquitted  on  entrapment  grounds,  because  the
government had to talk him into buying the material. Id. at 548-54.
34.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (1962)  (emphasis added).
35.  Thus, under the objective test, the defendant may be acquitted even if the bait
used was of the type  that might  attract  people  who were not predisposed. But under
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Under  this approach,  the court does  not  care  whether the defendant  was  or
was not personally predisposed to commit the crime (hence his reputation and
the like are  irrelevant);  it cares  only whether  the method used against him is
likely to ensnare people who are not criminally predisposed.
From the beginning, modem entrapment law has been  an intricate patch-
work of these two general  approaches.  The "subjective"  approach  is the pre-
dominant  one in this country.36 A few jurisdictions make exclusive  use of the
"objective"  approach,  which  also  comes  in  different  versions.37  Most  ju-
risdictions  use  both approaches,  in varying blends.3 8  Jurisdictions  also differ
on  the  appropriate  standard  of proof  in  entrapment  cases.39  These  matters
remain in flux.
40
This  complex  state  of affairs  is  one  indication  of the  difficulty  that
courts,  and  other  regulators  of police  activity,  have  in  defining  the  proper
limits of sting operations. 41 The problem,  as one Supreme  Court opinion put
it, is that "a  line must be drawn between the trap for the unwary innocent and
the trap  for the unwary criminal.,42 Where  does  the right  line lie?  Our pur-
pose in what  follows  is  to examine  the general  structure  of this problem  in
light of the informational and behavioral purposes stings may serve.
the subjective  test, the potential  effect  on other hypothetical  people  is  irrelevant;  all
that matters is whether he himself was predisposed.
36. See PAUL  MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT  DEFENSE  52 (2d ed.  1995).
37. See id. at 39-43.
38.  Some acquit  the defendant  if entrapment is established under either the sub-
jective  or objective  test. See id. at  44-47. Others  acquit  only if entrapment  is estab-
lished under both tests. See id.
39.  Everyone  agrees that the defendant's crime must be proved beyond  a reason-
able doubt. But  if the defendant says  he was entrapped  into committing the  crime by
the police, by what standard  is  the entrapment  issue judged?  Many jurisdictions,  in-
cluding the federal courts,  say that once the defendant  establishes  that he was induced
by the police  to commit  the offense,  the state  must prove beyond  a reasonable  doubt
that he  was  predisposed  to commit  the  crime  in  question.  But  many  states  opt  for
lower standards.  See,  e.g.,  State  v.  Hammeren,  655  N.W.2d  707,  709  (N.D.  2003)
(defendant  must prove all  elements of entrapment defense by a preponderance  of the
evidence);  State v. Grubb, 725  A.2d 707,  711  (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999)  ("State
must disprove...  entrapment by 'clear and convincing'  evidence.").
40. Legislatures  and police organizations  have also  struggled with  the problem,
often adopting guidelines that go beyond the requirements set forth by the courts. See,
e.g.,  UNITED  STATES  DEP'T  OF  JUSTICE,  UNDERCOVER  AND  SENSITIVE  OPERATIONS
UNIT, ATTORNEY  GENERAL'S  GUIDELINES  ON FBI UNDERCOVER  OPERATIONS  (1992),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/undercover.htm#general  (reason-
able suspicion of wrongdoing is a prerequisite to use of undercover agents);  SEATrLE,
WASH.,  MUNICIPAL  CODE  §14.12.020  (2004)  (prohibiting  surveillance  for  purely
political purposes).
41.  Legislatures and police oversight bodies have joined the courts  in struggling
with the problem.
42.  Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958)  (emphasis added).
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II. STING OPERATIONS  AS AN INFORMATIONAL  DEVICE
A. Informational  Objectives
Courts tend to see exposing crooks as the main justification for sting op-
erations.  An  influential  passage  comes  from the  Supreme  Court's  first  en-
trapment decision:
Artifice and stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged in
criminal  enterprises.  The appropriate object of this permitted activ-
ity, frequently  essential to the enforcement  of the law, is to reveal
the criminal design; to expose the illicit traffic, the prohibited pub-
lication,  the fraudulent  use of the mails, the illegal  conspiracy,  or
other  offenses,  and  thus  to  disclose the would-be violators of the
law.
43
This purpose-"to  reveal  the  criminal  design"--is the  central  theme  in  the
case law on stings.
The  case law  is  full of similar statements. Typical  is this  claim by the
California  Supreme  Court:  "The  function  of the  enforcement  officials  is  to
investigate,  not instigate, crime; to discover, not to promote,  crime." 44 Or take
this remark by Judge  Posner, in a case  in which agents helped an arsonist set
up his crime and arrested  him just before he torched  the building:  "It  is par-
ticularly difficult  to catch arsonists,  so  if all the police were  doing here was
making  it  easier  to  catch an  arsonist-not  inducing  someone  to become  an
arsonist-they were using law enforcement  resources properly and there  is no
occasion  for judicial  intervention. 4 5 Our focus  here will be on  this function
of identifying likely criminals.
A note  on  terminology. As  the italicized  language  above  suggests, the
intended targets may be  law violators  or would-be  law violators.  Many sting
operations are  employed  to track  down, or  generate  evidence  against, active
criminals. For example, agents might set up a phony trash collection  business
in order to attract extortion attempts  from mobsters  who have been threaten-
ing  local businesses.  Many other  stings  are  directed  against potential crimi-
nals, that is,  people who may or may not have committed  crime in the past,
but are  likely to do  so in the  future. Consider the cop who pretends  to be an
adolescent visitor to an internet site for pedophiles: he is trying to catch indi-
viduals who  are inclined to prey on children, whether  or not they have  done
so in the past.
43.  Sorrells  v.  United  States,  287  U.S.  435,  441-42  (1932)  (italics  added  and
citations omitted).
44.  Patty v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs,  107 Cal.  Rptr. 473, 478-79 (Cal.  1973).
45.  United States v. Kaminski,  703 F.2d  1004,  1010 (7th Cir.  1983)  (Posner, J.,
concurring).
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I will merge these two groups-potential and actual lawbreakers-into a
single  category  interchangeably  called  "criminals"  or  "offenders."  (These
terms are equivalent  to the doctrinal formulations  of "predisposed"  or "ready
and willing";  I use  my terms  because  they produce  a  bit more  expositional
clarity.)  Essentially, for purposes  of the analysis to follow, the assumption  is
that  there  is  a  group  of individuals  who,  left  to  their  own  devices,  would
likely have committed  a crime  (or would be predisposed  to do so)  independ-
ent of police involvement. Thus, a sting victim  is a criminal  if he would have
committed the same type of offense had he never been  targeted by the police.
He would  have had both motive and  opportunity to commit  a genuine  crime
even without the sting.
I use the  term  "genuine"  or  "independent"  criminal  opportunity inter-
changeably  to mean  an  opportunity not created by a  sting operation.  So,  for
example,  a criminal  operation with  no police  involvement  is a genuine  crimi-
nal opportunity. A criminal  opportunity staged by the police would be a non-
genuine  opportunity.  There  is,  of course, a  continuum  here:  an undercover
agent  may play  a  critical  role, or instead merely  a  minor role,  in  a  criminal
operation, in which case the question arises whether the crime was genuine  or
a sting-that is, whether the  crime  would have come off without  the agent's
help. Consider,  for example,  the undercover agent who  supplies hardware  for
a  pipe bomb;  perhaps  a  non-agent  would  have  done the  same  thing, so  we
might consider the crime genuine.
A separate category, distinct from criminals  or offenders,  consists of in-
dividuals  we  will  call  "non-criminals"  or  "non-offenders"  or  "innocent. ' 46
These  are  individuals  who  would  not have--or  probably  would  not have-
committed  the  offense  charged  if they  had  not  been given  the  opportunity
provided  by the  government  agent.47 Let me emphasize that that these indi-
viduals are not necessarily "innocent"  in the ordinary sense of the word:  they
have, by assumption, committed  the crime charged,  albeit with the assistance
or encouragement  of an  undercover agent. The only reason  we refer to  them
as non-criminals  or nonoffenders or innocent is for expositional clarity.
Of course,  there  is  a  strongly  artificial  element  in  this  distinction  be-
tween  criminals and non-criminals. Not everyone  we have branded a "crimi-
nal"  seizes  every  genuine  opportunity  to  commit  any offense.  At  the  same
time,  not  everyone  we  have  branded  a  non-criminal  always  refrains  from
committing a genuine offense. Even the normally  law-abiding among  us may
sometimes  succumb to temptations  to criminal activity. These complications
are undoubtedly evident to all.
46. Again, these terms are intended to be equivalent to the doctrinal references  to
those who are not "predisposed"  or "ready  and willing"  to commit crime.
47.  For the most recent  Supreme  Court  pronouncement  on  the  subject,  see Ja-
cobson v.  United States, 503 U.S.  540 (1992),  in which  the Court ordered  the defen-
dant acquitted  after  a  government  front organizations  spent  years  talking  him  into
buying illegal child pornography.
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Nonetheless,  it is analytically useful to draw a rough distinction between
criminals and non-criminals.  There are those who are  far more likely to seize
criminal  opportunities than others.  Our interest here is in using baits to iden-
tify  these individuals.  The  authorities  want  to identify  (catch  and/or  gather
evidence against) criminals.  Our assumption in what follows is that this is an
appropriate  state objective.48 As noted above,  the authorities'  ultimate  objec-
tive  is  not  necessarily  to  punish these  individuals;  the objective  may  be to
build a  case against  them, which can  be used to secure their cooperation  in
catching bigger fish.
The theory behind using  a sting for informational  purposes is that it op-
erates  as  a test.  If the target committed  this staged  crime, the thinking  goes,
he  is likely to commit real crimes as well.49 More precisely, in committing the
crime  set  up by the police,  the  target  signals that he  is likely to commit,  or
attempt, independent crimes  in which the police are not involved. If the inter-
net pedophile arranges  a secret meeting with  a police decoy pretending to be
a child, he is likely to do or have done the same with real children.
But how  likely,  as a positive  matter?  This  is  the critical  question if the
sting is being used  for informational purposes. The police have set a trap de-
signed to catch a criminal. What are the chances  that the defendant caught in
the trap  is in fact  a criminal? Each  decision maker  in the defendant's  case-
the prosecutor deciding  what  charges  to bring,  the jury deciding  whether to
convict,  and  the judge  deciding  on a sentence-may  have  to face this prob-
lem.
B. A Bayesian Framework
The  problem  is  one of Bayesian  inference.  The  decision  maker  knows
that the defendant  rose  to the  bait put out by the police. The  decision maker
also has some background data, or beliefs, about the defendant's likelihood of
being  a criminal.  From these bits  of information  the decision  maker tries to
judge  the  overall  likelihood  that  the  defendant  is  a  criminal.  Expressed  in
odds form,5 0  that overall likelihood is equal to
48.  Some  commentators  are  troubled  by  this  notion  of using  stings  to  catch
individuals  who  would commit,  but  have not  (been proven  to have)  committed, any
crime.  See, e.g.,  Jonathan  C. Carlson,  The Act Requirement and the Foundations  of
the Entrapment  Defense, 73 VA.  L. REV.  1011  (1987).
49.  Courts  tend,  however,  to disapprove  of "sentencing  entrapment,"  in which
the  agents  talk  the  target  into  dealing  with  a  larger  quantity  of drugs  than  he  had
contemplated,  in order to put  him in  a higher  sentencing  category.  See,  e.g.,  United
States  v.  Staufer,  38  F.3d  1103  (9th Cir  1994)  (defendant  was  predisposed  to  sell
drugs,  so not entitled to acquittal on  entrapment grounds;  however, he was entitled to
a  lesser  sentence  because  the  agents  convinced  him  to  substantially  increase  the
amount of drugs he was predisposed to sell).
50.  Odds  and  probability  are  related  as  follows.  If p  is  the  probability  of an
event, then the corresponding  odds are p/(l  -p) to  1. For example, if the probability  of
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background  odds x sting diagnosticity.
Thus,  for example,  if the background  odds that he is a  criminal are  2 to
1, and the sting's diagnosticity  is 5  to  1, then the overall odds  that the defen-
dant is  a criminal  are  10 to  1. Let  us consider the  meaning  of each of these
terms.
1. Background Odds
"Background"  here  refers  to  information  other than the  fact  that  (or
manner  in which)  he took  the bait.5'  Background  odds of 2  to  I means  that,
looking at the background  information alone (that is,  not knowing whether he
took the bait), the decision maker would conclude that the odds are 2 to 1 that
the defendant  is a criminal  . The information  on which these odds are  based
may be gathered before the sting; often the police will investigate a target and
gather incriminating  information before holding out a bait for him. But it may
be gathered after the fact;  for example,  following a drug sting, the police may
find drug paraphernalia  at the target's house.53
The  background  odds  are  derived  from  whatever  information  is  made
available  to the decision  maker concerning  the defendant's likelihood  of be-
ing  a criminal.  It might  be statements that  the defendant  makes  to police  or
third parties, either before  or after the sting. It might be earlier arrests or con-
victions  for  similar offenses.  It  might be  other evidence  of the defendant's
character  or  criminal  propensities.  The jury  is  frequently permitted  to  hear
such evidence  in entrapment  cases,  subject to  familiar  limits  on admissibil-
ity.54 And even if the jury does not hear it, the prosecutor may hear it and take
it into account when charging; likewise the judge, when sentencing.
the event is .75,  then the odds are (.75)/(.25)  = 3 to 1. This relation  is readily derived
from Bayes'  theorem concerning probabilities.
51.  The  manner  in  which  the  defendant  takes  the  bait (eagerly  or  reluctantly)
obviously may furnish  some information about whether  he is a criminal. But we  treat
this as part of the diagnostic value of the sting, not as background  information.
52.  In Bayesian  language, the background  odds are the "priors", that is, the ante-
rior odds that the defendant is a  criminal. I avoid the "priors"  terminology in the text
to  prevent  the  misleading  impression  that  the  information  is  necessarily  gathered
before  the sting operation. "Priors"  is  also confusing  because  it  is slang for prior of-
fenses.
53.  The target's taking the bait may tip off the police that they should investigate
him further. Also, it may give them probable cause to search his premises.
54.  See, e.g., United States v. Van Horn, 277 F.3d 48 (1st  Cir. 2002). Federal and
state  rules of evidence  prohibit the admission of character evidence,  or of prior bad
acts,  to prove action  in  conformity  therewith. See FED.  R. EvID.  404;  state rules  are
roughly  identical.  That rule generally  does not  apply to  entrapment  cases, where the
issue  is not  whether  the defendant  committed  the crime, but  whether  he was  predis-
posed to  do so. See, e.g.,  United States  v. Neville,  82 F.3d  1101,  1107-08  (D.C.  Cir.
1996).
2005]
19
Hay: Hay: Sting Operations, Undercover Agents, and Entrapment
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005MISSOURI LAW  REVIEW
The background odds for a given defendant  may or may not be different
from  those of the  general  population.  In some  instances, there  may be  little
specific information one way or the other about the defendant's likelihood of
committing crimes. If so,  the relevant  background  odds  are  simply  those of
the average  member  of the population.  In  other  instances,  there  may  be  in-
formation  that  makes  the  defendant  stand  out  from  the  crowd,  as  less,  or
more, law-abiding  than average. In  such  cases, the background  odds are cor-
respondingly higher or lower than average.
2. Sting Diagnosticity
This refers to  the sting's effectiveness  as a  test. Diagnosticity  is,  in es-
sence,  the ratio  of true positives  to false positives.  For our purposes,  taking
the bait is a "positive," that is, a possible signal that the target is a criminal.  A
true positive  occurs when the bait  is taken by a criminal;  a  false positive oc-
curs when  the bait  is taken  by  a  non-criminal.  Sting diagnosticity  of 5  to  1
means that the bait is five times more likely to be taken by a criminal than by
a non-criminal.
The signaling value of different stings can vary enormously.  Sometimes
the police devise a trap that only a criminal can  fall into. Consider the case of
an  undercover  cop who approaches  a target  and offers to buy, right then and
there,  a substantial quantity of cocaine. The target agrees and pulls out of his
pocket a large quantity  of the drug, packaged  for sale. The target's behavior
reveals him to be a drug dealer; presumably he is likely to sell to people other
than the cop. By asking for the drugs to be produced  on the spot, the cop has
screened  out non-drug  dealers,  who  are unlikely  to be walking  around with
large packages of cocaine. The one who falls  into the trap sends a strong sig-
nal that he is a criminal.
Other stings  generate much weaker signals. Consider a target offered an
unusually  tempting  opportunity,  one  she  never  would  have  encountered  in
real  life. Suppose  the target is given a chance to steal  a large amount of cash
at  little apparent  risk.  A crook-someone  who would commit  other thefts-
may be more  likely than an honest  person to take this bait. But an otherwise
honest person might well take it, though he never would have committed theft
without this once-in-a-lifetime  opportunity. This sting thus provides at best  a
modest signal that the sting victim is a real thief.55
55.  Real-life examples  are plentiful.  A target was offered 20 kilos of cocaine  at a
colossal discount, having been  told that the  agent (supposedly an airline worker) had
found the drugs  in some cargo.  State v.  Anders,  596  So. 2d 463,  464 (Fla. Dist.  Ct.
App.  1992). The target had  never engaged in trafficking,  but was talked into  it based
on the  huge profit he would make.  Id. at 465.  The court held that the target was  en-
trapped. Id. at 468.
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Still  other  stings  may  have  no  signaling  value.56  If the  police  agent
makes an "offer that cannot be refused,"  then the target reveals nothing about
himself by accepting. This is especially likely to happen  when the police use
criminal  informants  to carry out stings.  The informant, hoping to  earn either
money or leniency  from the police, 57 sets out to arrange  as many drug deals
as he can that will lead to arrests. He  begs his friends  to buy or sell  drugs for
him,  claiming  that  he  is  desperately  ill,  that  he  owes  money  to  dangerous
people, etc.; when his friends fall for it, they are arrested.58 Obviously,  a sting
of this  type is  not very  probative  of the target's criminal  tendencies.  Even  a
non-criminal,  who would not otherwise consider buying or selling drugs, will
succumb if enough pressure is put on him.
Another sting with little signaling value is one in which threats  are used
to  secure the target's participation. 59 Indeed,  a sting of this nature may have
negative signaling  value,  tending to  suggest  that  the sting  victim  is  a  non-
criminal.  In  numerous  cases,  the undercover  agent  starts  by exerting  mild
pressure  on  the target, pleading with  him  for help;  when the target demurs,
the agent badgers or threatens him until he finally gives in. Often the target is
a  recovering addict, trying  hard to stay  clean.  Here,  the target's  reaction to
the sting-taking the bait only very reluctantly-may indicate that he was not
likely to commit the crime in the absence of the agent's blandishments.
For this reason,  a  sting  may  tend to exonerate  rather than  incriminate,
even  though  the  target  took  the  bait. Of course,  apparent  reluctance  is not
necessarily  exonerating.  Professional  crooks  often  feign  reluctance  when
approached to do a "job" (precisely in order to ward off stings) before finally
accepting  the  offer.  If there  is  strong  background  evidence,  the  decision
maker  may  yet  conclude  that  the  overall  odds  are  high  that  the target  is  a
criminal.  But that may be  in spite of, not because  of, the target's reaction  to
the sting.
56. It has zero signaling value if diagnosticity is  1 to 1.  It gives no more informa-
tion than flipping a coin.
57. In some instances, the informant is a criminal  defendant, and has been prom-
ised leniency if he arranges  a certain quota of drug deals that lead to arrests. In other
instances, the informant  is paid in cash-either on  a per-arrest basis, or as  a percent-
age of the dollar amount of the drug sales. Courts generally throw out convictions that
are the product of such contingency fees. See State v. Glosson, 462 So.  2d  1082 (Fla.
1985); State v. Florez, 636 A.2d  1040 (N.J.  1994).
58.  See United States  v.  McLernon,  746  F.2d  1098  (6th Cir.  1984)  (agent  tells
his friend that the mob will kill him unless the target gets him some drugs).
59.  An instance  is Robichaud  v. State, 658 So. 2d 166  (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.  1995),
in which  an undercover  agent asked  the  target to obtain cocaine  "to  alleviate  pain he
suffered  from  cancer  and  chemotherapy  treatments."  Id. at  167.  The  target  had  no
previous  experience  with  drugs.  Id. at  168.  When  the  target  demurred,  the  agent
claimed  that that he had mob  connections,  "his boys,"  who would "take  care of" the
target if he didn't obtain the drugs. Id.
60. See  Wagner  v. State, 467 S.E.2d 385  (Ga. Ct. App.  1996), for such a case.
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Figure 1 - Overall probability that a sting victim would commit in-
dependent offense, given background  evidence and sting reliability.
C. Applying the Framework
Figure  1 gives  an  intuitively  accessible  illustration  of the  relation  be-
tween sting reliability  and  background  information.61 It shows the combina-
tions of these  two factors  necessary to yield a  given  level of confidence  that
the victim of a sting would commit a  similar crime  independently  of police
involvement.
The  horizontal  axis, "sting reliability,"  is a measure of the sting's accu-
racy rate  in identifying criminals:  it  indicates  what  fraction of positives  are
true positives.  A number greater  than .5 means that the sting has some  sig-
naling  value:  criminals  are  more  likely  to  fall  for it  than  non-criminals.  A
number less  than  .5 means  the sting has negative signaling value:  it is  more
likely  to  catch  non-criminals  than  criminals.  A value  of .5 means  it  has no
signaling value.
The vertical axis refers to the background probability that the sting vic-
tim is a criminal.  This is  the likelihood drawn from the available  information
other than the target's reaction to the sting, as discussed above.  It is the same
as the background  odds, except described  in  terms of probability  rather than
61.  The derivation of the figure is explained  in the Appendix.
62. If a is the probability that a criminal will fall into the trap, and b the probabil-
ity that a non-criminal will fall into it, the horizontal  axis represents the scale a/(a+b).
\  \ \  \
\  \
\  \
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odds. This representation shows the structure of different possible entrapment
rules.
1. Standards of Proof
The  three  curves-which  were  chosen  more  or  less arbitrarily-in  the
figure  represent  the  combinations  of sting  reliability  and  background  prob-
ability that establish three chosen levels of confidence that the sting victim is
a  criminal.63  So,  for  example,  a  combination  of .3  sting  reliability  and  .9
background  probability-coordinates  (.3,  .9)  in the  figure-is on the middle
curve,  meaning  that  the  overall  probability  is  .8  that  the  sting victim  is  a
criminal.
The  chosen curves  are  meant to  approximate  the different  standards  of
proof often employed in entrapment  cases.  Many jurisdictions,  including the
federal  courts, require  the  state  to shoulder  a burden  of proof beyond  a rea-
sonable doubt on the entrapment issue.64 Assuming, for purposes of analysis,
that reasonable doubt exists if there is at least a two percent chance the defen-
dant  is a non-criminal,65  a  defendant cannot be convicted  under this standard
unless  his  case  falls  somewhere  outside  the  top  curve  on  the  question  of
whether he would commit the crime independently.
66
Other jurisdictions put lighter  burdens on the state.  Some require proof
only  by  a  preponderance  of the  evidence  on  the  issue  of entrapment;  this
would  mean  the  defendant could not  be convicted unless  his case  fell  some-
where just above the diagonal  line. Some require  proof by clear and convinc-
ing  evidence, which  presumably  lies somewhere  between the preponderance
and reasonable-doubt  standards.  Perhaps the middle curve  in  the figure is an
approximation of this standard.
63.  These curves  were  selected because  I conjecture  they correspond  roughly to
the three most  common standards of proof in entrapment  cases below. Of course, a
decision maker  (perhaps a  national  security  agency)  might want  to use  a still  lower
standard of proof-say, 20 percent-in deciding whether  to retain an  employee  who
succumbs to a sting, in which case the  curve would be convex rather than concave in
shape.  The  curve  for  a  .20 standard  of proof would  be  the  mirror  image of the  .80
curve, reflected across the diagonal line.
64.  See supra note 39.
65.  Some put the numerical  line higher or lower. For discussion of the issue, see
Alexander Volokh, N Guilty Men,  146 U. PA.  L.  REV.  173 (1997).  Most courts avoid
attempting  to quantify  the  legal  standard.  For  an economic  analysis  of the  costs  of
judicial  error,  see  Louis Kaplow,  The  Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An  Eco-
nomic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL  STUD. 307 (1994).
66. Again,  we are treating as roughly synonymous  the question  whether the de-
fendant  would  have  committed  the  question  the  courts  focus  on-the  defendant's
"predisposition"--and  the question whether the defendant is  a criminal. The  analysis
can easily be adapted to either formulation.
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2. Subjective vs. Objective Approaches
We  noted  above  that the  "subjective"  approach  to  entrapment,  which
asks whether the particular defendant caught in a sting would have committed
the  crime  on his own--or more precisely,  was "predisposed"  to commit  the
crime-is  dominant  in  the  United  States.  The  implementation  of this  ap-
proach  tracks,  in broad outline, the Bayesian  model sketched  here.  In apply-
ing the formula, the courts consider the probative value of the sting itself, that
is, what it says about his criminal propensities. They also look at background
information bearing on his criminal  leanings, such as his actions or statements
on other occasions.
67
In contrast is the "objective"  approach, which asks whether the tricks or
inducements  used by the police are  likely to lure non-criminals  into commit-
ting offenses. To courts that use this approach,  the likely  actions or predispo-
sitions of the person(s)  actually caught in the trap are irrelevant;68 what  mat-
ters  is how the ordinary law-abiding person would respond to the bait offered
by  the agent.  In effect,  this  approach  focuses  exclusively  on  the diagnostic
value of the sting, ignoring  background information  about the target.  It con-
siders only where a case falls on the horizontal axis of figure 1.
A typical illustration  of the difference  here  is  found in the courts'  treat-
ment of so-called  supply-and-buy,  or take-back,  drug stings:  one agent  fur-
nishes the  target with a  stash of narcotics,  another  agent talks the target into
selling part of it, and he is then arrested for peddling drugs. Most courts seem
to agree that these stings generally have little if any probative value. With the
government  playing  both  supplier and  buyer,  the operation  scarcely signals,
in the view of the courts, that the target would sell drugs on his own.
69
Yet the  courts  treat  the victims  of such stings  in  very  different  ways.
Some courts  (following the "subjective"  approach), acknowledge  that supply-
and-buy stings are unreliable,  but they  look at the other evidence  in the case.
If there is strong  background  evidence  that the sting victim is a  drug dealer,
they will  allow a  conviction.
70  Other  courts,  employing  the "objective"  ap-
proach,  categorically  forbid convictions  based on  supply-and-buy  stings  be-
cause they see too great a risk that the stings will yield false positives-if not
67.  See,  e.g., United States v. Ramsey,  165 F.3d 980, 985 (D.C. Cir.  1999) (find-
ing  predisposition  based  on  prior  convictions,  tape recorded  conversations,  and  the
eagerness with which  the defendant took the bait). The type of evidence  admitted  for
this purpose is comparable  to the evidence judges consider in sentencing  a convicted
defendant in ordinary cases.
68.  See,  e.g.,  People v. Munoz,  No. E029685,  2002  WL 31032872,  at *5 (Cal.
Ct. App. Sept. 12,  2002)  ("In applying the objective test of entrapment, a defendant's
character, predisposition, and subjective intent are irrelevant.").
69. Often the target is an addict who has bought the drugs from the first agent for
his own use. The second agent usually has to pressure him into selling.
70. United States v. Brooks, 215 F.3d  842 (8th Cir. 2000), references  this princi-
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in  the particular  defendant's  case,  then  in the  run of cases.  In  these  courts,
acquittal  is  automatic;  it  does  not matter  how damning the background  evi-
dence is in the particular case.71
The  latter  courts, which  acquit  regardless of the background  evidence,
are  not behaving  as "good"  Bayesians.  Nonetheless,  it  is easy  to sympathize
with their position,  at  least  in principle.  They  see  supply-and-buy  stings  as
providing  next to  no  information  about  the target. If the proper  purpose  of
sting  operations  is  to  help  identify  criminals,  then-these  courts  might
think-a defendant  should not be  convicted on the basis of a sting that con-
tributes  nothing on this  issue. Perhaps they are  wrong in their view that sup-
ply-and-buy  operations  lack informational  value.  But if they were correct  in
holding that  view, it would make sense  not to permit their use when the ob-
jective of stings is to generate  information.
This reasoning  implies  that  a  defendant  should  not  be convicted  in  a
sting unless the  sting's reliability  is greater than  .5, that is, on the right-hand
side of the figure.  Only in the  right-hand region of the figure  does the sting
have any diagnostic  value. In the left-hand region, a target who takes the bait
does not thereby signal  that he is a criminal;  instead, he  signals the opposite.
This may be the logic behind the stance, taken  by many courts, that a defen-
dant cannot be convicted based  on an unreliable  trap, no matter how strong
the background evidence is.
III. STING OPERATIONS AS A DETERRENT  DEVICE
A. Deterrence  Objectives
Let us turn to the use of sting operations as a deterrent device. A natural
effect  of permitting  covert  police  activity-and  publicizing  the  fact-is to
make individuals fear that they may be under surveillance  without knowing it.
Obviously this policy is counterproductive if taken too far; civil  society wilts
if everyone suspects  everyone  else of being  a government  spy or agent pro-
vocateur.72  But properly  channeled,  the uncertainty  created by covert police
activities  can have very desirable  deterrent properties. If would-be  offenders
are worried that an apparently attractive  criminal  opportunity is really a trap,
they may decide to walk away from it.
73
71.  See,  e.g.,  State  v.  Overmann,  220 N.W.2d  914,  917  (Iowa  1974);  State  v.
Johnson, 268 N.W.2d 613 (S.D.  1978). These courts  will allow government agents  to
be on the supply end or the buy end, but not both.
72. North Korea and the former East Germany come readily to mind.
73.  Refraining  from crime is only  one possible  response.  Another  is to  commit
crime but proceed  more carefully  (mobsters might pat each other  down to  check for
wires). And there  will also be  a substitution effect, toward  crimes  less susceptible to
covert surveillance.
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This  is often just  the effect  sought  by  the authorities.  The  police  may
want  a  criminal  gang  to believe  that  it  has  been  infiltrated  by  government
moles.74  Likewise,  the police  may  encourage  would-be  offenders  to  believe
that some of their prospective victims  are really police decoys, and that their
crimes  will  be  caught  on  camera.75  The  theory  behind  punishing  sting  vic-
tims,  on this account, is not that they have revealed  themselves  to be  crooks.
Perhaps they have, perhaps not. Rather, the theory is to make people afraid  to
be  crooks.  If stings  are  believed to be  pervasive  enough,  then would-be of-
fenders will  shy away from  real criminal opportunities,  for fear that they are
stings.
Notice  that the  measure  of success  is  quite  distinct  for  informational
stings and deterrent stings.  With  informational  stings, the hope is to separate
the  crooks  from  the  law-abiding.  A  key  mark  of success  is  that  would-be
crooks  are  getting  caught  in  traps;  the  more  caught,  the  better.  Deterrent
stings  are  another  matter.  The hope  is  to  make  crooks  law-abiding.  A  key
mark of success  is  that would-be  crooks  are  not getting caught  in traps be-
cause they have been frightened  away from committing crimes.76 They  steer
clear not only of stings but of real criminal  opportunities as well because they
cannot tell them apart.
B. A  "Lemons" Framework
To examine the deterrent use of stings, let us bracket, to the extent pos-
sible,  the  information-gathering  function considered  in the last  Section. We
will  assume  here  that the  authorities'  objective  is not  to  identify  criminals
(that  is,  those  who  are  likely  to commit  independent  crimes),  but rather  to
discourage crime. Any information a sting reveals  about its targets  is, we will
assume, purely incidental  to the main goal of deterring crime.77
When  deterrence  is  the  objective,  the  government  creates  something
akin to the well-known market for lemons.78 The government introduces lem-
ons-phony criminal opportunities-that  resemble  the genuine article.  To the
would-be  offender, the risk of being caught in a trap makes it costlier to seize
apparent opportunities  for crime. He may therefore turn away genuine oppor-
tunities that would otherwise attract him. Just as the presence of lemons in the
auto market discourages  the sale of even good cars, the presence of lemons in
74.  The government faces  a tradeoff here. People suspected of being  moles may
be in grave danger.
75.  For example, the police will announce that a certain number of pedestrians in
dangerous  intersections are really cops ready  to arrest reckless drivers.
76. Of course,  the reason some are not being caught in  traps is that  they are  tak-
ing care to avoid them.
77.  The  overlap  occurs when the  government publicizes  its successful  sting of,
say, operators of a child pornography web site.
78.  See George A. Akerlof,  The Market  for "Lemons ":  Quality Uncertainty  and
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON.  488 (1970).
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the  market  for crime  discourages  genuine  criminal  transactions.  If the sting
totally succeeds,  the  market  for real  criminal  opportunities  "unravels,"  driv-
ing  criminals  into other activities. For example, if there were  enough phony
buyers  of narcotics  on the street,  the price of drugs would  rise  so high that
genuine buyers would disappear.79
This occurs under the following general conditions.  Suppose that an in-
dividual  gets an apparent criminal  opportunity:  someone  offers to sell  him a
substance  (drugs,  ivory, enriched uranium)  whose purchase  is unlawful.  The
offer may  be genuine or a  sting. The  individual  will refrain  from  accepting
the offer if the following holds:
probability of sting  >  expected gain if  genuine
expected penalty if  sting
The  "probability  of sting"  term refers to  the  chance that the  offer is a
sting rather than  genuine.  Parties to criminal  transactions  may fear that they
are dealing with government  agents. Governments  can  take  steps to  encour-
age  this fear,  sometimes  even  spreading  false  or exaggerated  rumors of the
existence of sting  operations.  Such  rumors  are  believable  because  they  are
sometimes true.
The  "expected  gain  if genuine"  refers  to  the  individual's  anticipated
profit from the crime if the opportunity is not a sting. It includes not only the
expected gain if he gets away with it, but any expected punishment from pos-
sible ex post detection.  The expected gain from genuine crime obviously var-
ies  across  individuals.  For some,  the  chance  to buy  an  illegal  substance  at
price $X will be very attractive, if the opportunity is genuine. For others, such
an offer is completely unattractive. The threat of a sting may not even be nec-
essary to dissuade them from accepting.
The  "expected  penalty if sting"  refers  to the anticipated  punishment  if
the seller is an undercover agent. Normally this would be a fine or imprison-
ment,  though  sometimes  the  state  resorts  to  public  exposure  instead.  The
prospect of being caught on tape committing a crime, and then seeing the tape
publicly released, may alone be a substantial deterrent for many.80
This  framework  can  easily  be  adapted  to  represent  non-transactional
stings involving violent crimes  and the like. "Lemons"  can take the form, for
example,  of cops  posing  as  prospective  victims  for  muggers,  peddlers  of
worthless  securities, or pedophiles. The framework can also easily be adapted
to  cover  civil  offenses,  such  as  race  discrimination  in housing,  and  can be
adapted to cover  stings used by private  organizations to deter dishonest  em-
79. This has obviously not yet occurred  in the narcotics market.
80.  In prostitution  stings,  the  police have  sometimes limited  themselves  to  re-
leasing  names  or  televised  recordings  of individuals  caught  soliciting  sex  from  an
undercover agent.
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ployees  and  the like.  The  above  inequality  captures  the conditions  in  all  of
these cases.
C. Applying the Framework
The problem facing the authorities  is to ensure that the above inequality
holds  for  the genuine  opportunities  encountered by an  individual.  If it  suc-
ceeds,  the  individual  will turn  away not  only  staged  opportunities,  but real
ones  as  well.  To  go  about its  task,  the government  can  try to raise the  left-
hand  side or lower the right-hand  side of the  inequality, or both.81 Our focus
here will be on the left-hand side, the probability of a sting.
1. Sting Types
The inequality  implies  that the behavior  of agents  must mimic  the  be-
havior of genuine  sellers.  This  is true  not only  because phony opportunities
must be unrecognizable  as such (many stings fail because  the target smells a
rat). It  is true  for a  less  obvious reason:  genuine opportunities  must also be
unrecognizable  as such  if the  purpose  of the sting  is  to deter genuine  sales.
The government  cannot permit genuine  sellers to have  a "trademark"  or dis-
tinguishing feature that enables the buyer to know he is safe from a trap.
In any  lemons  market,  the  buyer will  look  for credible  signs that he is
buying from a  genuine seller. One such signal may lie in the seller's actions.
If certain  behavior is prohibited  for undercover  agents, then anyone who dis-
plays the behavior signals that he is not an agent. The government has to pre-
vent  signaling  of this  type,  and  the only  way  for  it  to do  so  is  to have  its
agents copy the actions of genuine sellers.
An example  of government  failure  in this respect  is  police department
guidelines  that  used to prohibit  agents  from initiating  criminal  transactions;
such guidelines  required police to be solicited by the target instead.82 Experi-
enced  criminals,  aware of this policy, used  it as  a screening device  to make
sure  they were  not dealing with  undercover  cops.  They waited  for overtures
from apparent  customers.  If the other  party made  the first move,  he reliably
signaled that he was not an  agent. The deal  could then go forward. Deterring
this kind of transaction  required  agents  sometimes to imitate the parties who
make the first move, in order to keep the criminals  in doubt.
So too with tactics that are  a lot more objectionable  than mere solicita-
tion. The logic here is that if a genuine  criminal opportunity would have  fea-
ture  X,  then  stings  must also  sometimes  have  feature  X,  because otherwise
the presence  of X  in a  given  setting will  signal that the opportunity is  genu-
81.  It can  affect the  odds and expected  penalty of a sting.  It can also  affect the
"expected  gain  if genuine"  term,  by altering  the likelihood  and severity  of ex post
apprehension  and punishment-a standard insight of the law enforcement literature.
82.  These guidelines  apparently have been abandoned  in many jurisdictions.
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ine.  X may of course be something so bad that, for moral reasons, it should be
off-limits to agents. 83 But making it off-limits  means that genuine  sellers can
use it as a trademark.
2. Frequency
The inequality also implies a certain minimum frequency of offers made
by undercover  agents.  Suppose that,  for a  given target  group of individuals,
the  gain/penalty  fraction  on  the  right-hand  side  of the  above  inequality  is
1/10.  Then  deterrence  requires  that,  on  average,  at  least  10  percent  of the
offers  to  these  individuals  come  from  undercover  agents.  The  would-be
crooks  must  know  that  about  10  percent  of the  opportunities  they  get  are
stings.  As  the right-hand  fraction  goes up,  so  must  the  left-hand  side.  The
more attractive  real  opportunities become, the more lemons that must be put
into circulation to make criminal acts undesirable.
84
This does not mean  stings should be indiscriminately  aimed at everyone
in  the population.  If anything,  it  means  the  opposite.  Police  resources  are
limited; raising the probability of a sting for one person  entails  a lost oppor-
tunity to raise the probability  for someone else. It serves no deterrent purpose
to  throw resources  away on  targeting  individuals  who are  unlikely  to break
the law  in the first place.  This merely  dilutes the  deterrent value of sting op-
erations. The deterrent  value  is  greatest if everyone understands  that the po-
lice  are  concentrating  their  resources  on  those  who  most  "need"  to  be  de-
terred.
IV. TENSIONS  BETWEEN INFORMATION  AND DETERRENCE
So far we have highlighted the distinction between the informational and
behavioral  purposes of sting operations.  We  turn now to  an  equally  funda-
mental  point: the purposes  are  not  only  different;  they are  in large measure
incompatible. Pursuing deterrence  sometimes frustrates the goal of sorting the
crooked from the law-abiding.
83.  Consider United States v.  Skarie, 971  F.2d 317  (9th Cir.  1992), in which the
agent threatened  to kidnap  the target's child if the target did not  come up with some
narcotics. Id. at 318-19.
84.  Genuine  sellers of the  illegal good  may sweeten  their offers in  response  to
the presence of phony sellers  in the market. (Compare warranties  in the auto market.)
For example, they may lower their prices in order to offset the risk that the buyer may
be caught in a trap. The government must then make offsetting adjustments so that, in
equilibrium,  the number of lemons  is too  great  to  make purchase  worthwhile  at  the
new prices offered by genuine  sellers of illegal goods.
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A. Publicity
We briefly alluded to one respect in which this is true. When the objec-
tive  is to identify crooks, to catch them in the act, the police want to keep the
existence of undercover  agents  as hushed up as possible.  If the crooks whom
the police want to catch red-handed suspect that traps are being  set for them,
they  will  take evasive measures, 85 making  them  harder to  catch.  This frus-
trates the hope that that they will walk into a trap in the false belief that it is a
genuine  criminal  opportunity.  The  point here  is  simple:  when gathering  in-
formation is the object, the less crooks expect traps, the better.
Deterrent stings  have  the opposite property.  If the objective  is  to deter
criminals,  the authorities  want  to  create  the  impression  that  there  are  traps
everywhere.  Of course,  as with  informational stings, this requires making  the
traps  indistinguishable  from  real  criminal  opportunities;  stings  are  self-
defeating if they are recognizable  to would-be offenders. 86 But the hope is to
make  every  genuine  opportunity  seem  a  possible  trap. In  contrast,  with  in-
formational  stings, the hope is to make every sting  seem a  genuine opportu-
nity.  Thus,  while informational  stings should create  a false sense of security
for crooks, deterrent stings should create a false sense of insecurity. A choice
must be made between these strategies.
B. Ensnaring  the Innocent
There  is a more  troubling  conflict between  the informational and deter-
rent  uses  of stings. The  conflict  can  be  easily  stated:  deterrent  stings  often
require  the use of baits, or traps, that run  a strong risk of ensnaring the inno-
cent, that is, people who would never otherwise have committed a crime. This
is true in two basic respects.
1. Predisposition
Courts are  fond of saying that  stings should be used to ferret  out people
who are  "predisposed"  to commit a given crime before  being approached  by
agents. But many crimes occur in which the defendant has no evident predis-
position  before  being  approached  by  agents.  To  take  one  example  among
85.  The  evasion  might be desirable,  if it leads  the  individual  to  become  a  law
abider.  But  it may  take  less  desirable  forms:  the  crooks  may  continue  to  commit
crimes but take greater care to ensure they are not dealing with undercover  agents.
86. There are many stories of stings that  flop because  agents  were easily identi-
fied  as  such.  An  amusing and  sometimes  tragic  example,  often  recounted  by cops:
police  officers  have  often  been  required  to  drive  specific  makes  of American  cars
when  impersonating  drug dealers.  This  has made them stand  out like a sore  thumb,
because  real  drug  dealers  often prefer flashy  foreign cars and  can  easily spot police
vehicles.  Stings have failed,  and cops have been shot, as a result.
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many,  in People v. Karraker,8 7 the  defendant,  a gun  expert who often made
silencers and other illegal paraphernalia for crooks, was convicted of convert-
ing a  lawful rifle into an  illegal fully automatic  machine gun  at the urging  of
some  government  agents.88  The court  threw out  the case,  convinced  that he
was  not predisposed  to  make  a  machine  gun  before  the agents  approached
him because the idea was implanted  in  his mind by the agents.8 9 Perhaps  so,
but surely there is a strong deterrence argument that people in Karraker's  line
of work should fear that anyone who makes such  a request may be an agent.
On another day, a real  crook might have approached  Karraker  with the same
request. In short, a predisposition requirement blunts deterrence.
2.  Inducements
There is a second  type of conflict, which  will occupy more of our atten-
tion. Put aside the issue of predisposition;  focus now on  the types of induce-
ment employed  to get the target  to  commit the crime. As  we  saw  above,  if
deterrence  is the aim, stings should use the same sorts of inducements that are
found in the real world of crime, that is, in genuine criminal transactions.  But,
critically, the real criminal world may involve inducements that are not diag-
nostic, that  is,  inducements  to which  the  normally  law-abiding  may  easily
succumb.  To deter their acceptance,  the  same types of inducements  must be
used by the authorities.9 0  If the  authorities  forswear  such inducements,  then
the recipient of such  an inducement  will know it is genuine and will be  more
tempted to accept.  It follows  that  deterring  crooks  will entail  catching  inno-
cents.
To  generalize  the  point,  suppose  that  in  a  given  criminal  market,  in-
ducements A  and B  are  commonly used  in real  illegal  transactions.  Assume
that  inducement A  is highly diagnostic,  meaning that only the criminally dis-
posed-those who are eager and likely to participate in the criminal market-
would  accept  it.  In  contrast,  assume  that  inducement  B  is  non-diagnostic,
meaning  that even  the non-criminally  disposed would be prone,  for whatever
reason,  to accept  it. (Perhaps  B  is a  large amount of cash or a threat.)  If un-
dercover  agents  are  only permitted to use  inducement  A in sting operations,
then  they are  in effect  allowing  B to become a "trademark"  or "warranty"  of
87.  633 N.E.2d  1250 (Iii. App. Ct. 1994).
88. Id. at 1251-52.
89. Id. at 1259.
90. Allen  et al., supra note 3, argue that the inducements used by the government
should be  no greater than  those used  in the genuine criminal  market.  But that is only
true if the government's  purpose  is to identify  crooks.  There may  be  some deterrent
value in  having  potential  crooks  know  that they  will occasionally  be receiving  very
attractive offers, and so should decline  these as well as ordinary offers. Naturally,  the
government  must be  careful  here;  if the  offer is  too good  to  be true, the  target may
recognize  it as a trap.
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genuineness.  The  recipient  of an  offer  of B  knows he  is  not the  target of a
sting and can proceed accordingly.
The  only way  to  prevent  this  is to create  a  market  of "lemons"  in  in-
ducement B-that is,  to let the world  know that there  are undercover  agents
out there offering  B. The hope is to lead individuals  to resist offers of B. Yet
this creates  a new difficulty: if agents go around offering B, they may, to the
extent deterrence  fails,  garner acceptances  from the non-criminally  disposed.
Indeed,  they may  wind up ensnaring  people who never would  have been of-
fered B in the real world, and so would never have committed any crime at all
were it not for the sting operation.
Let me give a pertinent example. Suppose the government wants to deter
people  from assisting  terrorist  organizations.  Suppose  further  that  terrorists
often use pressure tactics in order to obtain the assistance of others.9' We will
assume that anyone who lends such assistance commits a crime.92 To achieve
its deterrent  aims,  the government  must  have  its  undercover  agents  employ
similar pressure tactics (and publicize the fact that they will be doing so). Yet
when  agents  employ  pressure,  some  targets  will  inevitably  succumb to  it-
even though they are not inclined to assist terrorists, and perhaps never would
have  been  approached  by  a  real  terrorist.  So  the  trap,  necessary  for deter-
rence,  inevitably  catches  some  innocents  who never  would  have  committed
the crime  in question.
This problem would not occur if complete deterrence could be achieved.
In our example, suppose that, by announcing that its agents would be mimick-
ing all of the recruitment tactics used by real terrorists, the government  man-
aged  to deter  everyone  from succumbing to  the inducements,  including pres-
sure,  offered  by terrorist  organizations.  Then  no one  would  be  caught  in  a
government  trap since everyone would resist the blandishments of all recruit-
ers,  real  or  phony.  But  this  will  never  happen  in  practice.  If traps are  set,
some will be caught in them.
The  problem of ensnaring  the  innocent  would  also  go away  if govern-
ment agents  could identify non-criminals  in advance,  avoid  setting traps  for
them, and release those who  were inadvertently caught.  Suppose traps caught
only  those who, in the absence of the traps,  would be successfully recruited
by terrorists. If the existence of the traps were publicized,  some of these  indi-
viduals would be deterred from becoming recruits; others would walk into the
government's  traps.  In either case, there would be no danger of ensnaring the
innocents  who never would have lent assistance to terrorists.  But this, too, is
unrealistic.  Uncertainty  pervades  law  enforcement.  No one can  suppose that
those caught in stings will be limited to would-be offenders.
91.  For instance, a terrorist might make threats in  order to get a reluctant  person
to hide or transport weapons, money, confederates,  and so forth.
92.  We put aside  cases  involving pressure  so  severe  (such  as a  gun held  to the
head) that the individual has a defense of duress or necessity in a subsequent prosecu-
tion.
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A  further problem  is convicting non-offenders  who are caught  in traps.
If the authorities (prosecutors, judges, juries) could identify these individuals
ex post, there would be no danger of convicting them.93 But this too is a mat-
ter of probabilistic judgment and no system  is  guaranteed  to acquit  the non-
offender  while  still  achieving  the enforcement  purposes of stings.  The chal-
lenge then is devising an optimal probability for conviction.
V. AN ANALYSIS OF OPTIMAL STING POLICY
A.  The Model
Let us now consider the properties of a desirable sting operation, judged
in terms of the crime  it reduces relative to the innocents it ensnares. Assume
that the authorities  launch  a sting operation against  a group of individuals-
for example, offering  bribes or other inducements to airline baggage handlers
to  allow  agents  to  smuggle  forbidden  items  on  flights.94 The targets  of the
sting may be criminals (likely to permit smuggling even in the absence of the
sting)  or  law  abiders  (unlikely  to  permit  smuggling  in the  absence  of the
sting). Even if an individual  is a criminal, the knowledge of the possibility of
a  sting  may  discourage  him  from  accepting  the  blandishments  of  any
smugglers, real or phony.
Figure 2 depicts the sequence of events in the sting. An agent sets a trap,
offering big money to a baggage handler. The target may be a criminal or a
law abider.  If he is  a  criminal  who  has  been  scared off by the  prospect  of
sting  operations,  he  will  reject  the  offer.  This  might  be  too  strong  an
assumption;  an  individual  might  be  deterred  from  taking  offers  that  seem
suspicious,  while remaing  open  to offers that are  clearly  geniune.  We make
the  asumption  for  purposes  of expository  clarity;  little  of the  qualitative
analysis would change if we dropped it.
If he is a criminal  who has not been scared off by the prospect of a sting,
he may or may not accept the offer. Likewise,  if he is a law abider, he may or
may not accept the offer. The theory here is that as a law abider, he pays less
attention  to  police  enforcement  policy,  including  the  prospect  of  sting
operations, than do crooks.
The model is quite  simple in other ways. We do not explicitly model the
payoffs to individuals from accepting or resisting a smuggling offer, whether
real  or  phony.  Nor  do  we  specify  what  knowledge  they  have  about  the
likelihood  that  an  offer  is  real  or  phony.  We  therefore  do  not  attempt  to
93.  There  would  remain  the  problem  for  the  defendant  of mounting  a  costly
defense and perhaps spending time in pretrial detention.
94.  Such  stings to  check  for baggage handlers  being  bribed  into  permitting  the
smuggling of unlawful weapons  and explosives were  undertaken  at a number of air-
ports-interestingly, even before  the September  11  th disaster. See, e.g., American Air
StaffArrested in Drug Case, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 1999, at A4.
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predict  the  equilibrium  behavior  of criminals  and  law abiders  when  faced
with the sting. We simply take as exogenous their decision  whether to accept
an agent's offer.
Not-  -- , "f7rght
Figure 2 - Possible outcomes of sting operation. For simplicity, it is  as-
sumed that deterred criminals are not caught in stings. The a, b, c, and d
terms are employed  in the appendix and can be ignored here.
For policy purposes, the key question is whether the value of catching or
deterring  offenders  is  worth  the risks  the  operation  poses to  the innocent.
95
We will look at this problem from two points of view. First, we will look at it
from the perspective of the law enforcement  officials who decide  whether to
undertake  the  sting  operation.  Next,  we  will  look  at  the  problem  from  the
perspective  of the authorities-prosecutor, judge, jury-who decide whether
to indict and convict an individual who has been caught  in the trap.
95.  We ignore other costs of the operation,  such  as its  opportunity  costs to law
enforcement  or other indirect effects.
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B. The Decision  to Undertake the Sting Operation
The  authorities  are  considering  whether  to  launch  a  sting  operation
against baggage  handlers  at  major airports  around the  country.96 The  target
population may be a subpopulation of individuals  who, for some reason, have
come under suspicion of being susceptible  to bribes;  or the target population
may  be  a  random  selection  of baggage  handlers.  For  present  purposes,  it
makes no difference.  All that matters is that the authorities  are unsure which
members of the target population, if any, are offenders.
The authorities are also unsure which of the people caught in the sting, if
any,  will  be  convicted  of the  crime.  That  choice  is  left  up  to  subsequent
decision  makers,  who  may  conclude  that  certain  sting victims  are  innocent
(more precisely, that the odds that they are offenders  are insufficiently high to
secure  convictions).  Not  every  sting  victim  will  be  convicted.  As  we
emphasized  before,  it  is  generally  pointless  to punish  a  sting  victim  whose
likelihood  of  being  an  offender  is  insufficiently  high.  So  the  authorities
launching the sting must consider  the likelihood that those  caught in the trap
will be convicted.
The objective of the authorities is to launch the sting if its expected costs
are lower than not using it. The costs of not using the sting may be designated
[# of offenses that occur without the sting x costs of an offense].  Similarly, the
costs  of the sting  are  [# of offenses the sting  fails to prevent x  costs of an
offense]  +  [# of nonoffenders convicted  in sting  x  costs  of convicting a
97  98 nonoffender].  Some  simple  algebraic  manipulation  shows  that  using  the sting has lower expected costs than not using it if the following holds:
# of offenses prevented by sting  harm of convicting a nonoffender
# of nonoffenders convicted in sting  harm of  an offense
Note  that  all  of the  items  in this  expression  should  be  understood  in
expected terms, at the time the decision whether to launch the sting is made.
First, consider the left  side of the expression.  The phrase  "# of offenses
prevented  by  sting"  refers  to crimes  that  are  prevented  either  by  deterring
offenders  or by  convicting  and  punishing  offenders  who  fall  into  the trap.
Observe  that  there  is  a  complex  relation  between  the  numerator  and
denominator of the fraction.  As we discussed in  Part IV above, there  is some
possibility that the more effective  a sting is at deterring offenders, the greater
the risk of catching innocents  in a trap. Thus, it may be that as the numerator
rises, so will the denominator.
96. As is  done periodically. See supra note 94.
97. For clarity of expression,  we put aside  the  costs that may be incurred  by an
innocent  sting victim  who is acquitted  (costs such  as harm to reputation).  These  can
easily be incorporated into the analysis.
98. See the Appendix for a formal derivation of the expression  in the text.
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Whether  and  to  what  extent  this  happens  depends  on  how  well  the
authorities can, either ex ante (before the trap is set) or ex post (after a person
is  caught  in a  trap)  sort  offenders  from nonoffenders.  Examples  of ex post
sorting would be a prosecutor's decision to drop charges against, or a judge or
jury's decision  to acquit,  a  person who  is  considered  an innocent  who never
would have  committed  the  crime if not lured  into  doing  so.  (What  level  of
belief is  needed  for this  ex post decision  is  taken up below.)  The better  the
authorities  are  at  either  ex  ante  or  ex  post  sorting  of  offenders  and
nonoffenders,  the  greater  the  expected  value  of the  left-hand  side  of  the
expression.
Next,  consider  the  right-hand  side  of the  expression.  This  fraction
essentially  captures  the  importance  of avoiding false  convictions  versus  the
importance  of preventing  offenses.  This  may  vary  greatly.  The  numerator
depends  in  part  on  the  severity  of the  punishment  suffered  by  including
noncriminal  penalties  such  as  dismissal  from  a  job  by  an  employer.  The
denominator obviously depends on the nature of the offense: violent crime or
espionage cause greater harm than traffic offenses, for example.
Notice  that here too,  though, the right-hand  side  is deceptively  simple.
The  numerator  and  denominator  are  not  necessarily  independent  of each
other. The worse the offense, the greater the sanction is likely to be. And the
greater  the  sanctions  are,  formal  and  informal,  the  greater  the  harm  of
convicting  an  innocent  person.  Moreover,  it  may  be  that  the  two
denominators  in  the expression  are  not independent:  the greater the harm  of
an offense, the more (or perhaps  less) likely  a nonoffender  caught  in a trap is
to be mistakenly convicted.99
A final point about the expression  is that the harmfulness  of an offense
does not necessarily strengthen the case for launching a sting operation. True,
all  else being  equal,  the greater  the harm of an offense,  the more  likely the
expression will be satisfied.  For example,  all else being  equal, a  sting aimed
at terrorism is  more valuable than a sting aimed at trafficking  in stolen goods
because the right-hand denominator is greater in the case of terrorism. But for
reasons just noted,  increasing  the  right-hand  denominator  may  increase  the
right-hand  numerator  and  left-hand  numerator.  So  the  impact  of  the
harmfulness of the offense is at least ambiguous.
C.  The Decision to Convict
Now  let  us  turn to  the  question  whether  to convict  someone  who  has
been  caught  in  a  sting.  (Again,  conviction  should be  understood  broadly  to
include civil  sanctions and the like, depending  on the context.)  Assume that a
particular individual has  been caught in a trap.  There  is a  certain probability
that  he  is  an  offender.  That  probability,  as  we  saw  in  Part  II  above,  is  a
99. This  is  a  difficult  question.  Juries  may  be  more  concerned  about  avoiding
errors when serious crimes are involved. But the opposite is also possible.
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function of the background information  on the individual  and the diagnostic
value  of the trap.  How high should that probability  be to warrant convicting
him?
We noted above the possibility of simply convicting everyone  who falls
into the  government's  trap.  For  a variety  of reasons,  though,  this  approach
seems distinctly  inferior to one that would evaluate the defendant's  criminal
propensities.  We saw in Part III that effective  deterrence  may require the use
of  baits  that  lure  non-criminals  into  their  traps.  The  costly  process  of
prosecuting  such individuals  would  needlessly  dilute  the deterrence  exerted
on the true criminals. Hence there is an argument  for undertaking some effort
to  sort  the  true  criminals  from  the  unfortunate  innocents  who  have  been
drawn into the  government's  web. That is,  there is an  argument  for setting a
threshold probability  that  a sting  victim  is  a true  criminal;  if he  falls below
that threshold, he should be  acquitted (on grounds  we call  "entrapment").  So
again the question: what should that threshold probability be?
The  essential  tradeoff here  is between  preventing  crime and  preventing
convictions of nonoffenders.  If the threshold probability  for conviction  is  set
very  low,  then  many  nonoffenders  will  be  convicted.  But  if the  threshold
probability for conviction  is set very high, then offenders  caught  in traps will
be freed,  and  (more  importantly)  other offenders  will  not  be  deterred  from
committing crimes. Thus some balance  must be  struck between these dangers
in choosing the appropriate threshold probability for conviction.100
Analytically,  the problem  here resembles  the problem just analyzed, of
deciding whether to  launch a sting at all.  There  is,  on one hand,  the relative
harm  of false  convictions  versus  the  harm  of the offense.  There  is,  on the
other  hand,  the  relative  effectiveness  at  preventing  the  offense  versus  the
likelihood  of  false  convictions.  The  precise  expression  of  the  optimal
probability involves  a cumbersome  degree of notation.  It is  easier to express
the solution  in term of odds,  as we did in Part  II.  Drawing on the analysis of
the previous  problem just  analyzed,  we  find that  the  optimal  threshold  for
conviction can be expressed as follows:
Odds defendant is an offender  >
harm of convicting a nonoffender  # of  offenses deterred by sting
harm of an offense  # of nonoffenders caught in sting
As the expression indicates,  the crucial elements  in determining whether
to convict are the harm of convicting a nonoffender relative  to the harm of an
offense,  and  the  number  of  offenses  prevented  versus  the  number  of
100. Related  work,  outside the  context of sting operations,  has been  done on the
problem  of setting  the  right  threshold  probability  for  conviction.  See  Michael  L.
Davis,  The  Value of Truth and Optimal Standards  of Proof  in Legal Disputes, 10 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 343 (1994);  Kaplow, supra note 65; Thomas J. Miceli,  Optimal Prose-
cution of Defendants Whose Guilt Is Uncertain,  6 J.L. ECON. & ORG.  189 (1990).
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nonoffenders  caught.  Notice  that  once again,  all  else being  equal, the  more
harmful the offense, the lower the threshold probability needed to convict.
A  point  worth  emphasizing  is  that  this  expression  can  be  used  to
interpret either the "subjective"  approach to entrapment (in which the focus is
on the  individual defendant)  or the "objective"  approach  (in which the focus
is  on  the  average  defendant  who  could  be caught  in  the  sting).  If  the
subjective approach is preferred, "defendant"  in the left half of the expression
should be  construed  as the individual  defendant.  If the  objective approach  is
preferred, the term should be  construed  as the average defendant that would,
or might, be ensnared in the government's  trap.
Because  we  are  generally  more inclined  to think of uncertain  events  in
terms of "probability"  rather  than  "odds, ' "101  figure  3  is  designed  to  give a
general  sense  of the probability  required  to  convict.  The  horizontal  axis  is
simply the third term in the above expression, that is, the expected number of
offenses  deterred by convicting the sting  victim  versus the expected  number
of innocents  who  will be caught  in the sting. For lack of a  better term, I call
this the "deterrence  value"  of the sting. I  have arbitrarily  limited the domain
of this axis to 10 offenses deterred per nonoffender caught in a trap.
I  I  1
0.9
S  0.8  --  - _
0.7
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~0.4  5
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Figure 3  - Probability  required  to  convict, given  deterrence
effect and relative  cost of erroneous conviction.
101.  If the odds of an event are x (that is x to  1),  then the corresponding probabil-
ity is x/(x+ 1).  Thus, if the odds are, say, 4, this means that there is a 4 to 1  chance that
the individual  is an offender; this is equivalent  to saying that there  is a 4/5  chance,  or
.8 probability, that the individual is an offender.
[Vol.  70
38
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol70/iss2/2STING OPERATIONS
Then there is the second term in the expression-the  cost of convicting a
nonoffender  caught  in  a trap versus  the harm  of an  offense. I denote  this the
"relative  cost  of  error."  Three  randomly  chosen  values  of  this  term  are
contained  in the small box at the right of the figure.
The  figure  indicates  the  probability  required  to  convict,  given  the
combination  of deterrence value and the three arbitrarily chosen relative costs
of  error  in  the  box  at  right.  The  dependent  variable  (the y  axis)  is  the
probability  required  to  convict.  So,  to  take  an  example  at  random,  if the
relative  cost  of  error  is  5  to  1 and  the  deterrence  value  is  4,  then  the
probability  required to convict  would be .5. Thus, the decision maker  would
have  to be  at least 50 percent  certain that the defendant  is  an offender--one
who  would  have  committed  an  offense  independently  of  police
inducement. 1 0 2 If the probability  is  less  than  that,  the  defendant  should  be
acquitted on "entrapment"  grounds-he has committed the crime (with police
help), but the costs of convicting  him exceed the costs of the acquittal.
VI. SOME APPLICATIONS  TO ENTRAPMENT  DOCTRINE
In our brief overview  of entrapment  doctrine in Part  I, I identified  sev-
eral problems  that courts have had to confront:  (1) should there be an entrap-
ment defense?  (2) if so, should a "subjective"  approach (looking  at the  indi-
vidual defendant's proclivities) or "objective"  approach (looking at the meth-
ods used by the police) be the touchstone of entrapment;  (3) regardless of the
approach,  by what standard of proof should the entrapment defense be proved
in a given case?
The  foregoing  analysis  provides  solid  support  for  allowing an  entrap-
ment defense,  because  one can  imagine  sting operations  that would  ensnare
individuals  without  being needed  for either informational  or deterrent  goals.
For example,  offering  an individual  an extraordinary  sum of money  to com-
mit a minor offense  provides little information about whether he would com-
mit such a crime  in  the real world, where such extraordinary  rewards are  not
available.  Nor  is  it needed  for deterrence, which  requires  only that the  gov-
ernment mimic the inducements held out in the real world to would-be crimi-
nals. It is not surprising, therefore,  that a defense of entrapment is allowed in
every American jurisdiction.
But on the second and third questions, the model provides less guidance.
In part, the difficulty  lies in whether the  aim of stings is  to provide  informa-
102.  Under  the  "subjective"  test-that is  where  the  court  is  worried  about  the
proclivities  of the  individual  defendant-the  figure  would  be  50  percent  for  the
defendant  in question.  Under the "objective"  test, where  the  court is concerned  with
the average person who would be caught in the trap, the relevant  figure  would be 50
percent for the average  defendant.
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tion  (as most courts  seem to think)  or to deter. If the main goal  is to identify
crooks,  then using a subjective  approach-i.e.,  looking at all the information
available  about the defendant (his background  and reputation  as well as at the
diagnostic  value of the  sting)-is probably  more  sensible than  focusing ex-
clusively  on the diagnostic value of the sting. Perhaps this explains  why most
courts  use  some  variant of the subjective  approach,  i.e.,  take account  of fea-
tures of the defendant other than the mere fact that he took the bait.  However,
if deterrence  is the goal, then there would be less argument  for looking at the
properties  of the  individual  defendant:  the government  would  want  to  tele-
graph  the message  that anyone  who  takes  a  given  opportunity  runs  the risk
that it is a "lemon"  that will land him  in jail. Giving him the chance to show
that he personally is not the criminal type would not materially advance deter-
rent  goals.  Thus,  one can  make  a  case for  either the subjective  or objective
approach,  which may explain why they coexist in this country.
Finally,  on the matter of what standard of proof should be employed  in
entrapment  cases,  the  model  only tells  us  the relevant  parameters,  without
specifying  their  value.  Obviously,  their  value  would  vary  across  different
classes  of cases,  which  would  imply  different  standards  of proof for  these
classes.  All else being equal, for example, the more harm a court perceives in
convicting  a  nonoffender  (i.e.  one not  predisposed to  crime),  the greater  the
standard of proof should be. Perhaps  the variation  we see on the standard of
proof issue-some courts requiring proof beyond a  reasonable  doubt,  others
requiring  something less-reflects  differences  of opinion on how bad it is  to
jail someone  who might  never  have  committed  a crime  but  for the  govern-
ment's instigation.
The model  does,  however, yield two relatively  firm principles  to guide
courts'  thinking in the entrapment  area. First, as  a theoretical  matter, there is
no necessary  relation between  the informational  or investigatory  functions  of
sting operations  on the one hand, and the deterrent  functions  of sting opera-
tions on the other. Punishing  sting victims-that  is,  people  who succumb to
criminal  inducements-may  have  considerable  deterrent  value  even  if the
sting  reveals  little  or nothing  about  their  previous  criminal  proclivities.  In-
deed,  for reasons  examined  in  Part  III,  effective  deterrence  may require  the
use of criminal  inducements  that  may tempt the non-criminally  predisposed
into  committing  offenses.  For  deterrence  to  work,  there  cannot  be  any
"trademark"  inducements  that  only  real  criminal  recruiters  are  permitted  to
use.
Second,  for practical purposes,  a rule  enforcer would want to take  into
account both effects-informational  and behavioral-in  deciding whether to
impose  sanctions  on  a  sting  victim.  This  is  true  in  the public  enforcement
arena,  both  in criminal  and civil law  violations.  It also holds  for private en-
forcement,  such as  decisions by employers  or other organizations.  As  noted
before,  however,  sting victims  get the protection  of the entrapment  defense
only when  they are  criminally  prosecuted  for falling  into a  police trap.  The
optimal rule for setting a trap and convicting those who fall into it is set forth
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in the models in Part  V, which  include both  the deterrent  and informational
aspects of police traps.
Which  raises  the  question  why  so  many  courts  see  the  informational
function as the only legitimate one, in the sense that they will only  convict a
sting  victim  if the  sting  has  revealed,  or tends  to  reveal,  those  who  were
crooked before being approached by the government  agent. There are a thou-
sand judicial  opinions  to the  effect  that the  proper  business  of police  is  to
fight crime, not create it. But this is no answer to the question because the  ex
ante effect  of offering  criminal  inducements  has  the  effect  of reducing  the
crime rate. Some court opinions have recognized the deterrent value of stings;
but these are buried under the many opinions suggesting that the sole purpose
of stings is to ferret out criminals.
Perhaps  the courts'  reasons are  fully  explained by  the dangers  we cata-
logued earlier: 103 the risk that stings will be used to harass political dissidents,
the  waste of police  resources  on  targeting  harmless  individuals  who  would
never  have otherwise  committed  a crime,  the corruption  invited by allowing
police  to get  mixed up  in  criminal  enterprises,  the  symbolic  erasure  of the
state's moral authority, even the courts'  fear that they are being "prostituted"
into  creating  criminals  instead  of ridding  society  of them.  Honoring  these
admittedly  legitimate  concerns,  though,  comes  at  the  cost  of the  deterrent
value  that  would  be  realized  by  giving  the police  greater  leeway  in the  in-
ducements employed and in the selection of targets.
Other questions  are  posed  by  the courts'  contemporary  stance  toward
entrapment.  Consider the burden of proof that the prosecution must shoulder
on  the  question  of entrapment.  The  federal  courts,  and  many  state  courts,
require the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was predisposed to commit the crime the agent induced him to commit. °4  In
jurisdictions  that  employ  the  "objective"  test,  the  prosecution  must  prove
beyond a reasonable  doubt that  the trap would  not have led  an average  law-
abiding person to commit the crime.
In  terms  of the  expression  and  accompanying  figure  3  above,  this  is
equivalent  to  saying  that  the relative  cost  of erroneous  convictions  is  very
high.  But this poses a puzzle. No one doubts that the relative cost of convict-
ing  a  person  innocent of the crime charged  is  very  high.  ("Better ten  guilty
men  go  free  than  one  innocent  man  be  hanged.") 1 0 5  But  here  we  are  not
speaking  of innocence  in  the  ordinary  sense.  There  is,  by  assumption,  no
question  that  the defendant  is  guilty  of the crime  charged.  The  question  is
whether he  (or an  average person)  would  have committed it without  the en-
couragement of an  undercover agent. Whether  an  error on that question is  of
103.  See supra part II.
104.  Again,  no  one  doubts that  the state  must prove  beyond a  reasonable  doubt
that  the defendant  in  fact committed  the crime.  The  question is  whether  he was  en-
trapped into doing so.
105.  Others  would put the  ratio  much higher-99  to  1, or more.  See supra note
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comparable  magnitude  to  an  error  on  the  question of factual  guilt  is hardly
obvious.
Return  to  our  earlier  example  of the  airport  baggage  handler  who  is
bribed by an agent  into allowing forbidden items on a flight, and assume there
is  some  question  whether  this handler would  have  committed  such a  crime
had a trap not been set for him. This person  is undoubtedly less culpable than
a baggage handler who readily accepts bribes from real smugglers. Yet he has
committed  a  crime,  and is therefore  probably  more  culpable  than  someone
who never accepted any bribe, from either an agent or a genuine smuggler. So
the person who commits only  government-engineered  crimes lies somewhere
between  the  person  who  commits  no  crime  and  the  person  who  commits
genuine crimes.
This  might  be  taken  to  imply  that  the  relative  cost  of  error  on  the
question of entrapment is  lower, all else being equal, than the relative  cost of
error on the question of factual guilt. If so, the government's  burden of proof
on  the question  of entrapment  should be  correspondingly  lower. Of course,
nothing  in the model  says  where the burden  should lie.  The relative  cost of
error,  as  with  the  other terms  in the  expression  and  figure  in Part  IV.B,  is
exogenous  to  the  model.  It  is  worth  noting,  however,  that  whatever  the
government's  burden,  the  entrapment  defense  rarely  succeeds,  perhaps
because so many defendants have long criminal records.
Another puzzle  is the  treatment  of individuals  who are  willing but  not
able to  commit their crimes  without the assistance of government  agents. In
United  States  v.  Hollingsworth,0 6  the  defendants,  an  orthodontist  and  a
farmer, decided to try their hands at  international  money laundering-"a vo-
cation  for  which  neither  had  any  training,  contacts,  aptitude,  or  experi-
ence." 1 07 They formed  a  Virgin Islands  corporation  and put  an ad in the  pa-
per, which was  spotted by a U.S. Customs  agent  who set them up  in a  laun-
dering  operation  and  then  arrested  them. 1 08 The  court  of appeals  threw  out
their  conviction, holding that "predisposition"  is not enough  to overcome an
entrapment  defense;  the defendants  must  also be  in  a  "position"  to  commit
their  crime  without  the government's  help.'09 "No  real  criminal  would  do
business  with such tyros,"  according to the court, Ito making prosecution and
conviction a pointless exercise.
Other courts  have  taken  the  opposite  position,  saying that the govern-
ment need not prove that the defendants were actually  able to carry out their
criminal  designs.'  The  issue  remains  unresolved  in the courts.  Our  model
has implicitly assumed that a criminal is someone predisposed but also able to
106.  27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994)  (en banc).
107. Id. at  1200.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110.  Id. at  1203.
111.  See United States v.  Thickstun,  110 F.3d  1394,  1398 (9th Cir.  1997).
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commit the crime on  his own;  but the model is  easily adjusted  to  redefine  a
criminal as someone  who is not merely predisposed to commit a crime but is
actually  capable  of pulling  it off. With that adjustment,  the  analysis  carries
through entirely.
VII. CONCLUDING  REMARKS
Earlier I noted some of the potential advantages of sting operations over
other possible enforcement  methods,  such as pure  surveillance,  in which the
government  watches but does not participate  in the target's crime, and ex post
enforcement,  in which the government  waits for a crime to be committed and
then searches for and gathers evidence against the perpetrator.  To be sure, the
line between these  different strategies is  fuzzy at the margins.  One can imag-
ine enforcement efforts that would involve a combination of them. (Efforts  to
fight  the mob  or terrorist  organizations  might  easily  involve all  three.)  One
possible direction  for future  research might  be to identify  the conditions  un-
der which one or another  strategy is  best suited  to particular  types of crime,
civil offense, or organizational  infraction.
APPENDIX
The purpose of this Appendix  is to formally derive the results in Parts II
and V of the text. Assume that a given individual  is either a criminal or law-
abiding;"12 the state does not know which. If he  is a criminal, the state wants
to either  deter him or (if that  fails) convict  him.  It may use  a sting  operation
against individuals, possibly with some advance warning for its deterrent value.
The probability that the individual  is a criminal  is a;"13 if he is a criminal,  the
probability that he will not be deterred by the sting is b; if he is not deterred, the
probability that he will be caught in the sting (take the bait) is c. 114 If he is not a
criminal,  the probability  that he  will be  caught in the  sting is d. (It is  assumed
112. The  model  takes  as  exogenous  why  some  people  are  criminals  or  law-
abiding. A model of why people  fall into one or the other category would presumably
take into account an individual's perceived  benefits of committing crime, along with
his  perceived  chances of being  caught  and the  sanction  he would  receive.  Thus,  for
example,  if we  let  B  represent  the  perceived  benefits  of crime,  P the  perceived
chances of getting caught, and S the perceived sanction upon being caught,  we might
say that each individual has a distribution of (B,PS); for criminals, B  > PS, for non-
criminals, B < PS. The existence of stings would change a given individual's distribu-
tion  of (B,P,S), and so  might  alter  the rationale  for  targeting  and convicting  him. I
thank  Steve Shavell  for these observations,  though  I have decided they  would make
the model  overly complicated.
113. The term a  can be interpreted  as the number of criminals  on the street if no
sting is used, net of the number of criminals caught or deterred by other methods.
114.  For simplicity, we  assume that if he is  deterred,  he does not  succumb  to the
sting.
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that some noncriminals  may  fall into  the government's  trap, even though they
would  not  commit  crimes  of their  own.)  These  possibilities,  and  the  corre-
sponding notation,  are  depicted in the  decision tree  (figure 2)  in  Part V of the
text.
Let p  represent  the conditional  probability  that the individual  is a crimi-
nal, given that he has taken the bait in the sting. By Bayes'  rule, we have
abc p  =  abc  + (1 - a)d  (1)
Figure  1 in the text  is  derived as  follows.  Let  r represent  the  fraction bc
-,+d  ;this corresponds to what we called the sting's "reliability"  in the text., 15
Substituting r into (1) gives
ar
ar+(1-a)(1-r)  (2)
Figure  1 plots the pairs (r, a) satisfying (3),  given three arbitrarily  cho-
sen values ofp.
Now turn to the analysis in Part V of the text. To determine the value ex
ante of the sting operation, assume that society sustains harm J ifa criminal  is
neither  deterred  nor  convicted,  and  sustains  harm  K  if a  non-criminal  is
caught  in a  sting  and  convicted.  Assume  further  that anyone who  takes  the
bait in a  sting is convicted with probability  q.  The expected cost of the sting
operation  is then ab(1 -c)J + abc(l -q)J  + [(1 -a)d]qK. The expected  cost if the
sting is not used is aJ.  Using the sting is preferable  if
a[(1-b) + bcq]J>  (1-a)dqK,  (3)
which may be rewritten as
a[(1 - b) + bcq)]  K > - (4)
(I-a)dq  J
The numerator  is the probability  that an offender will be either deterred
or convicted.  The  denominator  on the  left  equals  the probability  that a  law
abider will be convicted.
We  now  take  up  the  question  of convicting  someone  who  has  been
caught  in  a sting.  Assume that  there  are other individuals  in the population
similar to the person caught  in the trap;  the degree to which they are deterred
may depend on whether people like the defendant are  convicted. We will use
the  same  notation  as  above.16  The expected  cost of convicting  an  innocent
individual in the position of the defendant (that is  with a comparable  amount
115.  The term  bc represents  the conditional  probability  that a criminal  will take
the bait; the term d represents the analogous probability  for a non-criminal.
116. Notice that the decision maker may place a different value on the variables a
and b than did the authorities who undertook the sting (because new information  may
have emerged).
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of evidence)  is (1-a)dK. The expected cost of acquittal of a guilty defendant  is
[abc+a(1 -b)]J. Conviction is therefore preferable if
[abc + a(1-b)]J  > (1-a)dK,  (5)
that is, if
abc + a(1  - b)  K
(1-  a)d  J(
Now, let Q  represent the odds that a person in the relevant subset is an
offender. Applying  the  definition  of odds  (D  =  IPP)  and  incorporating  ex-
pression (1),  we have
abc
(1  - a)d  (7)
Then (6) can be rewritten as
>  K  a(1-b)
J  (1-a)d  (8)
In the second  term of the right-hand side, the numerator is the probabil-
ity that an offender will be deterred;  the denominator is the probability that a
law abider will be caught in a sting.
Figure  3 in the text  is  derived  as  follows. Let x and y denote, respec-
tively, the terms K -  and  0---  Substituting these  terms into (9) and applying
the definition of odds (p =  t)  gives
P  >  y-X  (9)
y-x+1
Figure  3 plots the minimum pairs (x, y) satisfying (9),  given three arbi-
trarily chosen values of x.
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